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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Questions
This dissertation documents my exploration of the modern corporation in the
past few years. I outline a detailed picture of major U.S. public corporations in
more recent decades from two perspectives: ownership structure and internal
nepotism. I also study the private information carried in the CEOs’ unexpected
option exercise behavior. This dissertation aims to deepen our understanding of
the modern corporation and CEOs’ option exercise behavior.
First, I study the ownership structure of modern corporations by drawing
a detailed picture of the ownership structure for major U.S. public companies
from 1994 to 2012. Berle and Means (1932) find that widely held companies
were very prevalent for the 200 largest non-banking corporations, in which the
ownership of capital was dispersed among the small shareholders, but control
was concentrated in the hands of managers. During the time period from 1929
to 1963, Means (1967) shows that the ultimate ownership of big corporations has
become even more widely dispersed and that control has increasingly become
separate from ownership. Berle and Means (1932) and Means (1967) established
1
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the image of widely held public companies, around which the modern corporate
finance has developed, for major U.S. public companies (La Porta et al., 1999).
However, it is unclear how the ownership structure of major U.S. public compa-
nies has developed in more recent decades. In this dissertation, I document over
the past two decades a sharp upward trend in ownership concentration towards
institutional investors, namely financial institutions and private investors, which
are the driving forces of the elimination of widely held public companies. In
2012, only 2 percent of major U.S. public companies could be considered as
widely held. Widely held public companies are about to become extinct.
The evolution of ownership structure is shaped by investment strategies
of blockholders and the interactions among them. I find that institutional in-
vestor tends to target undervalued firms—that is, it increases (decreases) its
position when the firm’s performance is bad (good). By contrast, I find that
founding-family ownership is more likely to remain when a firm’s performance
is good. They tend to quit, voluntarily or involuntarily, when a firm’s per-
formance is bad. The different investment strategies adopted by institutional
investors and founding-families contributed to the development of such an
ownership structure that institutional ownership tends to be formed in firms
with poor performance and founding-family ownership is more likely to be
observed in well-performing ones. Moreover, institutional ownership interacts
with founding-family ownership, and can be seen has having contributed to
its decline. I apply standard event study methodology and find that there is
a significant abnormal decrease in founding-family ownership and the family
CEO ratio around the time in which institutional ownership enters the firm’s
ownership structure for the first time.
Second, I study the modern corporation in another angle by examining inter-
nal nepotism within major U.S. public corporations. The theory of the firm views
most organizations, including corporations, as a nexus for a set of contracting
2
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relationships among individuals, e.g., employees, suppliers, customers, credi-
tors, etc., and consider these contractual relations as the essence of corporations
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). In this dissertation, however, I find that nepotism
is surprisingly prevalent in the S&P 1500 firms, of which 53.46 percent exhibit
nepotism. I study nepotism in a social network perspective and measure the
strength of nepotism by degree and density. I find that firms with nepotism
underperform significantly. The abnormal return is 31 basis points (bps) per
month, or 3.8 percent per year, over the estimating period. This point estimate is
significant at the 5 percent level; 72 percent of the firms having founding-family
ownership exhibit nepotism, which is more than 20 percent higher the one with-
out founding-family ownership. Overall, my empirical results demonstrate that
nepotism is associated with worse firm performance, especially for firms having
founding-family ownership. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of
the internal structure of modern corporations. My contribution to the existing
literature is the development of a nepotism database covering family ties within
major U.S. public companies from 1994 to 2012, and a nepotism index indicating
the strength of nepotism.
Third, I examine the private information carried in the CEOs’ unexpected
option exercise behavior. Based on a novel CEO option exercises and corre-
sponding option portfolios database, we document that 88 percent of the CEOs
option exercises are ex ante identifiable “expected” exercises. The remaining 12
percent deviate from expected option exercises and carry private and negative
information on the firm’s future performance. We find there is a significant dif-
ference in market reaction to the expected and unexpected option exercise. We
also document that the unexpected exercises are associated with more negative
firm performance in the future, both in short-term and long-term. Our study
provides a new framework for examining insider information contained in CEO
option exercises.
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1.2 Extracting Data in SEC Filings Using Textual Anal-
ysis Technique
The data disclosed by the public companies are scattered in filings, which are
usually unstructured. In this dissertation, I mainly rely on the Perl program-
ming language, which is a powerful textual analysis instrument, to extract
structured or unstructured data from electronic SEC filings. I construct three
unique databases: First, blockholder ownership database. My contribution to
the existing blockholder literature is the development of a large shareholder
ownership database covering a sample of 3,148 major U.S. public companies
from 1994 to 2012. Second, I construct a nepotism database, in which I identify
all disclosed family connections among corporate insiders within major U.S.
public companies. Third, I construct a CEO option exercises and corresponding
option portfolio database.
1.3 Outline
The results are reported in chapter 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Each chapter is
self-contained. Chapter 2 is based on my job market paper titled “The Extinction
of Widely Held Public Companies”. Chapter 3 is developed from one of my
working papers titled “Nepotism and Equity Prices”. Chapter 4 is developed
from my working paper titled “Unexpected Executive Stock Option Exercises”.
4
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The Extinction of Widely Held
Public Companies
2.1 Introduction
The separation between ownership and control bothered students of corpora-
tions from Adam Smith to Berle and Means and Jensen and Meckling (Fama
and Jensen 1983). In this paper, I examine the ownership structure of major U.S.
public companies in more recent decades and draw a detailed picture of the own-
ership structure of major U.S. public companies during the period 1994 to 2012.
My contribution to the existing blockholder literature (e.g., Dlugosz et al. 2006;
Holderness 2009) is the development of a large shareholder ownership database
covering a sample of 3,148 major U.S. public companies from 1994 to 2012. I con-
sider four types of ownership in this paper, including: institutional ownership,
founding-family ownership, the employee ownership plan, and corporation
ownership. In line with previous studies (e.g., Holderness 2009), I consider a
company as widely held if there is no large shareholder holding greater than or
5
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equal to 5 percent, which is the cutoff value of a firm for mandatory disclosure
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
I document over the last two decades a sharp upward trend in ownership
concentration towards institutional investors, namely financial institutions and
private investors. There is a sharp increase in both their ownership and num-
ber. During the period 1994 to 2012, the aggregate institutional ownership has
increased from 10.46 percent to 26.27 percent. The concentration of ownership is
the driving force of the elimination of widely held public companies. In 2012,
only 2 percent of major U.S. public companies could be considered as widely
held. The increase in institutional ownership is not evenly distributed. Invest-
ment manager ownership has experienced the largest increase during the sample
period. For hedge funds, there is an upward trend before the financial crisis in
2008 and a downward trend thereafter. However, the aggregate ownership held
by other institutional investors has been relatively stable over the sample period.
The concentration of ownership towards institutional investors started as early
as the 1980s. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) document the presence of four types of
large shareholders using a sample of Fortune 500 firms in 1980. These four types
of large shareholders include financial firms at 25.65 percent, families at 32.68
percent, pension and profit-sharing plans at 19.74 percent and firms and family
holding companies at 21.93 percent. In 2012, I have determined these numbers
were 95.16 percent, 14.04 percent, 2.28 percent, 3.76 percent, respectively. The
stability of the ownership structure of major U.S. public companies, which is
measured by the ownership life cycle, is significantly lower than two decades
ago. The average life cycle of founding-family ownership is 8.78 years, compared
to institutional ownership which is only 2.61 years. Institutional ownership re-
placed family ownership in the 1980s and has become since this time the most
prevalent of the large shareholders. Founding-family ownership has experienced
a steady decline in the last two decades.
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The evolution of ownership structure is shaped by investment strategies of
blockholders. Institutional investors are more diversified. They are capable of
adopting sophisticated trading strategies to limit their downside risk. By using
both firm fixed model and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM model, I find
that institutional investors tend to target undervalued firms—that is, it increases
(decreases) its position when the firm’s performance is bad (good). By contrast,
founding-families are usually not diversified (Anderson and Reeb 2003), and take
less risk than non-family firms (Naldi et al. 2007). I find that founding-family
ownership is more likely to remain when a firm’s performance is good. They
tend to quit, voluntarily or involuntarily, when a firm’s performance is bad. The
different investment strategies adopted by institutional investors and founding-
families contributed to the development of such an ownership structure that
institutional ownership tends to be formed in firms with poor performance and
founding-family ownership is more likely to be observed in well-performing
ones.
The interaction among different types of ownership determines which type of
ownership will survive in a firm’s ownership structure. Institutional investors
tend to target undervalued firms. This is significantly related to subsequent
third-party acquisitions, which leads to an abnormal decrease in founding-family
ownership and the family CEO ratio. I calculate normal founding-family owner-
ship and investigate abnormal changes in founding-family ownership and the
family CEO ratio. By using a sample of 236 companies, I find that the cumulative
abnormal change in founding-family ownership during the time window [-1,5]
is -6.05 percent on average, while the cumulative abnormal change in the family
CEO ratio during the time window [-1,5] is -16.5 percent. Both of them are
significant at the 1 percent level. The causal direction tends to be clear since
the subsequent third-party acquisitions, which are significantly facilitated by
the institutional ownership, are the main reason for the abnormal change in
7
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founding-family ownership and the family CEO ratio. Institutional ownership
interacts with founding-family ownership, and can be seen has having con-
tributed to the decline in founding-family ownership. Institutional ownership
also has a significant impact on the composition of boards. It tends to increase
the ratio of independent directors and decrease the ratio of insider and family
directors. The cumulative abnormal change in the ratio of independent directors
during the time window [-1,5] is 2.2 percent on average, which is significant
at the 5 percent level, while the cumulative abnormal change in the ratio of
insider and family directors during the time window [-1,5] is -2.4 percent and
-1.5 percent on average, which is significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level,
respectively.
The ownership structure of major U.S. public companies exhibits some unique
characteristics that help blockholders achieve a sort of balance between liquidity
and control. In major U.S. public companies, institutional investors together
hold a significant stake in the firm, but each institutional investor only holds a
relatively small stake. Moreover, founding-family ownership and institutional
ownership can co-exist in a firm in the U.S.; founding-family holds more shares
than each institutional investor when it is present, but holds less than the aggre-
gate shares held by the institutional investors. By allowing multiple institutional
investors to be involved, each institutional investor obtains liquidity at the
expense of losing control to a lesser content—that is, the ownership held by
institutional investors as a whole can be controlling when necessary. However,
an ownership structure that is characterized by multiple institutional investors
who have a significantly shorter life cycle of ownership is inherently unstable
because of information asymmetry. Institutions herd as a result of inferring
information from each other’s trades. This may lead to a chain reaction when
one powerful blockholder fails.
I add to the available literature on the ownership structure originating from
8
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Berle and Means (1932). They find that widely held companies were very preva-
lent for the 200 largest non-banking corporations, in which the ownership of
capital was dispersed among the small shareholders, but control was concen-
trated in the hands of managers. During the time period from 1929 to 1963,
Means (1967) shows that the ultimate ownership of big corporations has become
even more widely dispersed and that control has increasingly become separate
from ownership. Berle and Means (1932) and Means (1967) established the
image of widely held public companies, around which the modern corporate
finance has developed, for major U.S. public companies. According to La Porta
et al. (1999), “for at least two generations, their book has fixed the image of
the modern corporation. · · · The modern field of corporate finance has devel-
oped around the same image of a widely held corporation, as can be seen in
the central contribution of Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Grossman and Hart
(1980)”. In this paper, I examine the ownership structure of major U.S. public
companies in more recent decades and find that a concentration of ownership
towards financial institutions and private investors started to form as early as
1980 until after 2010. The concentration of ownership leads to the elimination of
widely held public companies. There have been several studies in the literature
questioning the empirical validity of widely held public companies. Eisenberg
(1976), Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
and Morck et al. (1988a) show that there is a modest concentration of ownership
even among the largest American firms. Demsetz (1983) argues that “In a world
in which self-interest plays a significant role in economic behavior, it is foolish to
believe that owners of valuable resources systematically relinquish control to
managers who are not guided to serve their interests”.
For a random sample of 375 U.S. public firms, Holderness (2009) provides
evidence that 96 percent of them had blockholders and argues that the image
9
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of the public firm is a myth.1 However, I show that the image of widely held
public companies might not be a myth, that is, major U.S. public companies
were widely held, but they are eliminated in more recent decades. Previous
studies such as Mintzberg (1983), Chaganti and Damanpour (1991), and Faccio
et al. (2011) have shown that firms take strategies responsive to controlling
shareholders’ goals and expectations. I also add to the growing literature on
the blockholder ownership. Dlugosz et al. (2006) report blockholder data for
1,913 companies during the period 1996 until 2001. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach
(2009) analyze the effects of blockholder heterogeneity, and show that different
large shareholders have distinct investment and governance styles. Faccio et
al. (2011) find that firms controlled by diversified large shareholders undertake
riskier investments than firms controlled by nondiversified large shareholders.
Edmans and Manso (2011) propose a model in which blockholders monitor
firms by trading. Dhillon and Rossetto (2014) develop a model to show that
mid-sized blockholders emerge to mitigate the conflicts of interest between one
large shareholder and small nonvoting shareholders.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I present the
identification of the ownership data. In Section 2.3, I draw a detailed picture
of the ownership structure of major U.S. public companies in order to provide
a context for subsequent analyses. In Section 2.4, I study the evolution of the
ownership structure. In Section 2.5, I study the impact of ownership structure
1There are several studies about the ownership structure of non-American companies. La
Porta et al. (1999) choose 30 firms in each country, and studied the ownership structure of large
corporations in 27 countries at the end of 1997. They show that few of these corporations were
widely held except in economies with very good shareholder protection. Claessens et al. (2000)
also document using a sample of 2,980 corporations in 9 East Asian countries that the separation
of management from ownership control is rare. Faccio and Lang (2002) document using a sample
of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries that 36.93 percent of the firms were
widely held and 44.29 percent of the firms were family-controlled. Morck (2005) explains the
origins and effects of blockholding around the world. Using a sample of 60 U.K. firms, Franks et
al. (2009) study the evolution of investor protection in the long-run and corporate ownership in
the United Kingdom over the twentieth century.
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on the boards. In Section 4.4, I offer a conclusion and suggest other avenues of
potential research.
2.2 Sample Construction
In my sample, I include all companies in the Excecucomp database which mainly
includes firms in the S&P 1500 index that covers approximately 90 percent of the
U.S. market capitalization. I consider the electronic proxy filings submitted by
the companies in the SEC EDGAR database as my data source for ultimate own-
ership.2 The company is required to disclose the ultimate beneficial ownership
of any person, including any “group” as that term is used in Section 13 (d) (3) of
the Securities Exchange Act, who is known to the registrant to be the beneficial
owner of more than 5 percent of any class of the shares. Moreover, the company
is required to disclose the ownership of all directors, nominees and executive
officers. I downloaded all the proxy filings submitted by the firms with the SEC
EDGAR database. In total, 3,148 firms submitted 30,690 proxy filings. The dates
for the proxy filings range from 1 January 1994 to 6 August 2012. I use the Perl
programing language, which provides powerful text processing facilities, to
identify and extract the ownership data disclosed in the proxy filings. This is
feasible and more efficient since companies are required to disclose ownership
in a standard format that can be identified and captured using Perl’s regular ex-
pression function (Zhu 2014b). I manually checked the proxy filings and cleaned
Perl-generated data for three rounds to correct problems with double counting
2I did not consider Thomson Reuters 13F database for two reasons. First, for at least 5 percent
of the firms in my sample, institutional investors, as reported by Thomson Reuters 13F database,
own over 100 percent of the firm, which is unreasonable. Second, it only includes institutional
ownership. I did not consider databases such as Orbis for two reasons. First, they fail to consider
the ownership double counting and overlapping problem, as noted by Dlugosz et al. (2006).
The fact that it is necessary to check the proxy filings to solve the ownership double counting
and overlapping problem motivates me to collect the ownership data from proxy filings directly.
Second, the Orbis database only offers up to 10 years of history.
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ownership, as noted by Dlugosz et al. (2006).3 I manually correct blockholder
name, as noted by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), which could be disclosed
differently across years or firms. In some cases, ownership data are disclosed in
the text instead of the table. I identify such ownership data by manual collection
facilitated with the Perl programing language. In my study, there were 4,323
institutional investors, 1,000 founding-families, 593 large corporate shareholders,
and 203 employee ownership plans. Over the sample period, there were overall
80,752 firm-year-blockholder observations.
Empirically, it is well documented in the literature (e.g., Dlugosz et al. 2006;
Holderness 2009) that it is difficult to calculate aggregate shares held by block-
holders when their ownership overlap. This problem, which will significantly
overstate aggregate ownership held by blockholders, exists in many ownership
databases. In order to overcome this problem, I manually check the footnotes
in the proxy filings and choose only the largest owner whenever ownership
might be considered to overlap in any way. The identified ownership is con-
sidered to be the lower bounds of the institutional ownership; 8.35 percent of
the observations have a dual-class ownership structure in my sample. For these
observations, I calculate the economic interests of the ownership. By default,
the variable “ownership” in this paper indicates the holder’s economic interests
in the company. I focus on economic interests instead of voting rights because
this paper intends to study who owns major U.S. public companies rather than
who controls them. Moreover, I take the view that economic interests are more
fundamental than voting rights because voting rights tend to converge with
underlying economic interests as time passes.
3As explained in detail in Dlugosz et al. (2006), the same shares are often double or triple
disclosed under different people or entities. While the SEC requires firms to detail the ownership
structure of jointly held block in the footnotes, many ownership databases ignore the footnotes.
This leads to the overlap of reported ownership, which might be either a full overlap or a partial
overlap.
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I consider a company as widely held if there is no large shareholder hold-
ing greater than or equal to 5 percent, which is the cutoff value of mandatory
disclosure for firms with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
I identify large shareholders based on the information disclosed in the proxy
filings. I follow Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and classify shareholders into four
types: institutional investor, founding-family, employee ownership plan, and
corporation ownership, respectively. I use Bloomberg Businessweek which pro-
vides detailed descriptions of both public and private companies to identify the
types of shareholders. When this information was not available from Bloomberg
Businessweek, I conduct a name search in Google. The information has been
obtained from miscellaneous data sources, including among other sources Insid-
erMonkey, SEC 13F filings, and the owner’s home page. Institutional investor
is defined as an institution or an individual with an investment purpose or
providing financial services by holding at least 5 percent of a firm. According
to my definition, institutional investor includes investment managers/advisors,
hedge funds, private equity firms, commercial banks, financial services, pri-
vate investors, insurance, mutual/pension funds, holding companies, principal
investment firms, investment companies, self-management investment trusts,
sovereign wealth funds, and real estate investment trusts (REITs). Founding-
family ownership is the sum of the ownership held by the founder/co-founders
of the company and their family members. As noted by Anderson and Reeb
(2003), founding-family ownership is very prevalent among major U.S. firms. I
focus on founding-family ownership instead of general family ownership be-
cause the latter has an ambiguous definition, as noted by Miller et al. (2007). I use
Zhu’s (2014a) approach for identifying founding-family ownership. I identify
all disclosed founding-family ownership, which might be below the 5 percent
cutoff value, so as not to underestimate the family ownership. According to
my definition, the employee ownership plan mainly includes shares under em-
ployee stock ownership plans (ESOP), employee profit sharing plans, 401k plans,
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employee saving plans, etc. This is considered as a lower bound of employee
ownership because many employees can personally own shares. Blasi et al.
(1996) document that employee ownership plans became widespread in Western
economics in the 1970s and 1980s. Corporation ownership includes shares held
by a private or public company, most of which are companies in the related
industry. Corporation ownership might not serve for an investment purpose.
For instance, PepsiCo Inc. holds a significant stake in the Pepsi Bottling Group
Inc.4
The stability of each type of ownership differs. In the literature, Tirole (2005)
documents that institutional investors dominate liquidity trading in the United
States. Kojima (1997) documents that mutual funds and active managed pension
funds hold their shares for 1.9 years on average. On the other hand, founding-
families are believed to be long-term investors (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003). In
order to measure the stability of each type of ownership, for each blockholder, I
trace its evolution over time and calculate its ownership life cycle in the company,
which is the period from the owner’s initial acquisition to its complete sale. I
assume that the time of acquisition and the sale of the ownership are evenly
distributed. It follows that the expected acquisition time is half a year before
the proxy filing date at which ownership is observed for the first time, while
the expected sale date is half a year later than the proxy filing date at which
ownership is observed for the last time. The ownership life cycle is the difference
between the expected sale date and the expected acquisition date. My approach
4The shares owned by CEOs from the founding-families are included in the founding-family
ownership. In other cases, I do not consider shares owned by CEOs as a type of ownership since
this is more relevant to the managerial compensation literature. As reported in the Execucomp
database, CEOs own 2.61 percent of the outstanding shares on average. 18 percent of the CEOs
in the Execucomp database are from founding-families; 74 percent of them are the founders
and 26 percent of them are the descendants of the founders; 18 percent of the CEOs from the
founding-families hold on average 8.68 percent of firms. The remaining 82 percent are non-
family CEOs, which are not considered in my identification, hold on average 1.27 percent of the
outstanding shares.
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will underestimate the life cycle if the acquisition or disposition time is beyond
the sample period.
I identify the external network connections between boards and institutional
investors using the Perl programing language.5 The board’s link to an institu-
tional investor is a dummy variable, and equals 1 when there is at least one
director sitting on the board linked to an investment manager, private equity,
venture capital, or hedge fund; otherwise, it is 0. I identify whether a director has
a link by searching keywords “private equity”, “venture capital”, “hedge fund”,
and “investment manager/advisor”, in his or her background information using
Perl programing language in the proxy filings. This rationale of this approach
is that all companies are required to disclose background information about
their nominated directors, including relevant history in the company or industry,
positions on other corporate boards, and potential conflicts of interest.
In my sample, there are 30,690 firm-year observations for 3,148 firms. In
Table 2.1, I present the summary statistics of the sample. I present in this table
the firm characteristics of the sample, the summary statistics of the ownership,
and the board’s characteristics in Panels A, B, and C, respectively.
2.3 Detailed Picture of the Ownership Structure
I outline a detailed picture of the ownership structure of major U.S. public com-
panies during the period 1994 to 2012. I identify ownership data of shareholders
disclosed in the proxy filings that could have an impact on the firm. For each
5The Riskmetrics database has a variable (Classification = “L”) indicating directors affiliated
with a family or a financial institution. The definition fails to consider the difference between a
link to a family and to a financial institution and it treats them in an equal way. It is problematic
to put them in the same category because their roles are very different. Zhu (2014a) finds that a
link to a family indicates the presence of nepotism within the firm, which destroys firm value
since nepotism could be used as an entrenching tool. By contrast, a link to a financial institution
indicates a potential connection to a blockholder, which improves firm value by monitoring.
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TABLE 2.1: Summary Statistics of Sample. In my sample, there are 30,690 firm-year observations for
3,148 firms. I present in this table the firm characteristics of the sample, the summary statistics of the
ownership, and the board’s characteristics in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. These variables on firm
characteristics are from the Execucomp, CRSP and Compustat database. Volatility is defined as the
standard deviation of stock returns during two adjacent proxy filing dates annualized by multiplying
the square root of 252 trading days. I consider (AT+ME-BE)/AT as a proxy of Tobin’s Q, where ME is
the market value of outstanding equity, BE is the book value of the equity and AT is the total assets.
I follow Daniel and Titman (1997) in order to calculate book value of equity. I choose the data from
the Compustat FUNDA database that is closest to the proxy filing date. These variables on board
characteristics, namely board size, insider director, independent director, linked director and family
director, are from the RiskMetrics database. I identify all other variables from the proxy filings. For
these firms with dual class ownership structure, I calculate the economic interests of the ownership.
ROA are winsorized on both sides by 1% level.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Variable N Mean Min Max
Total Asset (Ln) 30,320 7.40 -2.34 14.63
ROA (%) 30,688 3.39 -52.59 25.11
Firm Age 30,690 23.53 0.00 86.00
Volatility (Annualized) 30,686 0.45 0.01 7.23
Tobin’s Q 30,656 1.97 0.22 89.00
Share Repo/Total Payout (%) 30,690 35 0.00 100
IPO Dummy 30,690 2.03% 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Ownership Characteristics
Variable N Mean Min Max
Institutional Investor (Dummy) 30,690 82.43% 0.00 1.00
Founding-family Ownership (Dummy) 30,690 28.30% 0.00 1.00
Employee ownership plan (Dummy) 30,690 5.06% 0.00 1.00
Institutional Investor Number 30,690 2.21 0.00 13.00
Institutional Ownership (%) 30,690 19.09 0.00 69.90
Invest. Manager Ownership (%) 30,690 13.02 0.00 48.20
Hedge Fund Ownership (%) 30,690 1.81 0.00 87.50
Employee ownership plan (%) 30,690 0.52 0.00 51.80
Founding-family Ownership (%) 30,690 3.88 0.00 50.80
Dual Class Dummy 30,690 8.35% 0.00 1.00
Panel C: Board Characteristics
Variable N Mean Min Max
Board Size 24,899 9.45 3.00 39.00
Insider Director Ratio (%) 24,899 19.25 0.00 80.00
Independent Director Ratio (%) 24,899 69.48 0.00 100.00
Linked Director Ratio (%) 24,899 11.26 0.00 90.00
Family director Ratio (%) 24,899 3.53 0.00 100.00
Link to Private Equity (Dummy) 30,690 19.66% 0.00 1.00
Link to Venture Capital (Dummy) 30,690 21.14% 0.00 1.00
Link to Hedge Fund (Dummy) 30,690 1.27% 0.00 1.00
Link to Invest. Manager (Dummy) 30,690 38.19% 0.00 1.00
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TABLE 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Ownership. I present descriptive statistics of different types of ownership in
this table. I use Bloomberg Businessweek which provides detailed descriptions of both public and private companies
to identify the types of shareholders. When this information was not available from Bloomberg Businessweek, I
conduct a name search in Google. The information has been obtained from miscellaneous data sources, including
among other sources InsiderMonkey, SEC 13F filings, and the owner’s homepage. The ownership life cycle is the
difference between the expected sale date and acquisition date.
Ownership Type N Percent Freq. Percent Ownership Ownership
(Mean) Life Cycle
(Years)
1. Institutional Investor 2,501 57.9% 68,410 84.7% 8.6% 2.61
(Financial Inst. and Private Investor)
Investment manager/advisor 799 18.5% 49,411 61.2% 8.1% 2.99
Hedge fund 566 13.1% 6,275 7.8% 9.0% 2.34
private equity 440 10.2% 2,588 3.2% 14.5% 2.40
Commercial bank 145 3.4% 1,688 2.1% 9.4% 1.91
Financial services 124 2.9% 3,158 3.9% 8.4% 2.02
Private investor 119 2.8% 716 0.9% 12.1% 3.50
Insurance 106 2.5% 2,635 3.3% 10.2% 2.65
Other investment entities 91 2.1% 514 0.6% 13.7% 3.10
Mutual fund/pension fund 85 2.0% 1425 1.8% 8.9% 2.56
2. Founding-Family 1,000 23.1% 8,684 10.8% 14.3% 8.78
Founding-Family (Ownership≥5%) 694 16.1% 5,560 6.9% 20.9% 8.24
3. Corporation Ownership 593 13.7% 1,987 2.5% 17.5% 2.76
(Fama-French 12 Industries)
Others 114 2.6% 17.6%
health care, and etc. 72 1.7% 16.8%
Telephone and Television Transmission 72 1.7% 19.8%
Business Equipment 69 1.6% 17.9%
Consumer NonDurables 63 1.5% 20.6%
Utilities 55 1.3% 16.2%
Manufacturing 49 1.1% 11.9%
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 33 0.8% 19.6%
Consumer Durables 29 0.7% 10.5%
Oil, Gas, and etc. 20 0.5% 20.1%
Chemicals and Allied Products 17 0.4% 21.6%
4. Employee ownership plan 203 4.7% 1,553 1.9% 10.3% 7.65
5. Non-Profit Organization 26 0.6% 118 0.1% 12.3% 2.35
Overall 4,323 100.0% 80,752 100.0% 9.5%
large shareholder, I identify its type and trace its evolution over time. I iden-
tify 4,323 institutional investors, 1,000 founding-families, 593 large corporation
shareholders, and 203 employee ownership plans. Over the sample period, there
are 80,752 firm-year-blockholder observations overall. I present the descriptive
statistics of different types of ownership in Table 2.2. I present the evolution of
the four different types of ownership over time in Table 2.3.
TABLE 2.3: Evolution of Ownership Over Time. I present evolution of four types of ownership, namely institutional ownership, founding-family
ownership, corporation ownership and the employee ownership plan, over time in this table. I elaborate on the definition of the ownership in Table 2.2.
Institutional Investor is defined as an institution or an individual with an investment purpose or providing financial services by holding at least 5
percent of the firm. In my definition, it includes investment managers/advisors (invest. manager), hedge funds, private equity firms (PE), commercial
banks, financial services, private investors, insurance, mutual/pension funds, and other investment entities. Institutional Investor Dummy equals
1 when there is at least one institutional investor holding at least 5 percent of the firm; otherwise, it is 0. Institutional Ownership is the aggregate
ownership held by institutional investors. N is the number of institutional investors. “Own.” is an abbreviation of “ownership” and it is reported in
percentage. The “Year” is the calendar year of the proxy filing date where the ownership is identified. I report the mean for all variables in this table.
Year N Institutional Investor Founding-Family Corporation Ownership Employee
Own. > 0% Own.≥5%
Dummy Own. Largest Own. N Dummy Own. Dummy Own. Dummy Own. Dummy Own.
1994 870 0.60 10.46 6.18 1.21 0.27 4.44 0.17 4.24 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.70
1995 1128 0.65 11.86 6.83 1.36 0.30 4.44 0.18 4.19 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.76
1996 1296 0.68 12.14 7.08 1.40 0.31 4.90 0.21 4.67 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.77
1997 1650 0.71 13.86 7.81 1.57 0.33 4.89 0.21 4.63 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.72
1998 1715 0.72 14.85 8.09 1.68 0.33 4.99 0.21 4.72 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.65
1999 1787 0.74 15.16 8.38 1.70 0.32 4.82 0.22 4.58 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.69
2000 1685 0.77 16.06 8.95 1.77 0.32 4.55 0.20 4.28 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.69
2001 1644 0.77 16.46 8.95 1.83 0.31 4.32 0.20 4.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.68
2002 1640 0.79 17.25 8.95 1.94 0.30 4.05 0.19 3.82 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.70
2003 1688 0.83 18.43 9.54 2.07 0.29 3.96 0.19 3.75 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.62
2004 1729 0.85 18.96 9.63 2.17 0.28 3.80 0.18 3.58 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.53
2005 1762 0.87 20.16 9.87 2.32 0.27 3.57 0.18 3.36 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.47
2006 1632 0.89 20.89 10.17 2.41 0.25 3.40 0.17 3.21 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.44
2007 1744 0.91 22.40 10.16 2.64 0.26 3.52 0.17 3.33 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.36
2008 1878 0.90 25.22 10.64 2.93 0.26 3.79 0.17 3.58 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.30
2009 1828 0.92 23.78 10.59 2.77 0.26 3.68 0.16 3.46 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.29
2010 1799 0.95 24.59 10.89 2.88 0.25 3.52 0.15 3.30 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.28
2011 1727 0.95 24.91 10.71 2.99 0.24 3.44 0.15 3.22 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.25
2012 1488 0.95 26.27 10.55 3.25 0.23 3.19 0.14 2.99 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.23
Overall 30690 0.82 19.09 9.32 2.21 0.28 4.04 0.18 3.81 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.52
Chapter 2. The Extinction of Widely Held Public Companies
I consider a company as widely held if there is no large shareholder, namely
if there is no institutional investor, founding-family, corporation ownership, and
employee ownership plan, as described in Table 2.2, holding more than or equal
to 5 percent of the firm. As Figure 2.1 shows, in 1994, 28 percent of firms used
in my sample, which mainly covers S&P 1500 firms, could be considered as
widely held. In 2012, only 2 percent of the firms examined could be considered
as widely held companies. Widely held public companies are about to become
extinct.6 My results confirm and extend the findings of Holderness (2009). The
elimination of widely held public companies is driven by the dramatic upward
trend in the institutional ownership, as documented in Figure 2.2.
The electronic proxy filing in the SEC EDGAR database was not available until
1994. The only paper I am aware of in the literature that provides a systematic
empirical analysis of large shareholders in the 1980s is Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
in which they collect the data of large shareholders for a sample of 456 out of the
Fortune 500 firms in December 1980. They identified the presence of four types
of large shareholders: financial firms (25.65 percent), families (32.68 percent),
pensions and profit-sharing plans (19.74 percent) and firms and family holding
companies (21.93 percent). I document that the numbers of the four types of
shareholders in 2012 were 95.16 percent, 14.04 percent, 2.28 percent, 3.76 percent,
respectively. Institutional ownership has replaced family ownership and has
become the most prevalent large shareholder within major U.S. public companies.
The concentration of ownership towards institutional investors started as early
as the 1980s.
The extinction of widely held companies occurs ubiquitously in all industries.
6La Porta et al. (1999) consider a firm as widely held when there is no controlling shareholder—
that is, if the sum of the shareholder’s direct and indirect voting rights exceeds an arbitrary
cutoff value, which is alternatively, 10 percent or 20 percent. The percentage of widely held
companies in my sample decreased from 59 percent to 14 percent under a cutoff value of 10
percent, and decreased from 81 percent to 39 percent under a cutoff value of 20 percent over the
sample period.
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FIGURE 2.1: Evolution of Widely Held Public Companies in the United States. I
plot the evolution of widely held public companies over time for all firms in the Execucomp
database, which mainly covers S&P 1500 firms. I consider a company as widely held if
there is no large shareholder holding greater than or equal to 5 percent, which is the cutoff
value of a firm for mandatory disclosure with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). I elaborate on the definition of the ownership in Table 2.2.
I group firms in my sample by Fama-French 12 industries. In Figure 2.3, I plot the
percentage of firms having at least one institutional investor over time for health
care and “Other” industry. The health care industry has experienced the most
dramatic increase in institutional ownership: the percentage of firms having at
least one institutional investor increased from 39 percent to 94 percent. This also
relates to the elimination of legal constraints. Hospital mergers and acquisitions
are in conflict with Section 7 of the Clayton Act which prohibits mergers. In the
mid-1980s, regulators have brought suits against 13 hospital mergers and won
most of them. However, since the mid-1990s, regulators have not successfully
enjoined a hospital merger (American Bar Association 2003). During this time,
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FIGURE 2.2: Evolution of Ownership of Major U.S. Public Companies. I plot the
evolution of four types of ownership, namely institutional investor, founding-family,
corporation ownership, and employee ownership plan, over time in this figure. The
institutional investor is defined as an institution or an individual with an investment
purpose or providing financial services by holding at least 5 percent of a firm. According
to my definition, this includes investment managers/advisors, hedge funds, private equity
firms, commercial banks, financial services, private investors, insurance, mutual/pension
funds, and “other investment entities”. “Other investment entities” includes firms or
organizations that do not easily fit into the other categories, namely holding companies,
principal investment firms, investment companies, self-management investment trusts,
sovereign wealth funds, and real estate investment trusts (REITs). My sample includes all
firms in the Execucomp database, which mainly covers S&P 1500 firms. The gray areas
in the figure indicate two economic recession periods, namely [01Mar01, 01Nov01] and
[01Dec07, 01Jun09]. The data are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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FIGURE 2.3: Percentage of Firms with Institutional Investor Over Time (By
Fama-French 12 Industries). I plot the percentage of firms having at least one in-
stitutional investor over time for health care and “other” industry in this figure. The health
care industry has experienced the most dramatic increase in institutional ownership: the
percentage of firms having at least one institutional investor increased from 39 percent
to 94 percent. The “other” industry, which includes mining, building material, entertain-
ment, etc., has experienced the smallest increase: the percentage of firms having at least
an institutional investor increased from 75 percent to 94 percent. The evolution in the
remaining 10 industries falls between the health care and “other” industry plotted in this
figure.
the percentage of firms in the health care industry having at least one institutional
investor increased from 39 percent to 85 percent. This is consistent with the
prediction of Roe (1990, 1994), who argues that widely held companies are not
a natural consequence of economic and technological forces. He predicts that,
absent the legal constraints, the evolution of modern corporations might have
resulted in the emergence of a very different organizational form. The “Other”
industry, which includes mining, building material, entertainment, etc., has
experienced the smallest increase: the percentage of firms having at least an
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FIGURE 2.4: Evolution of Institutional Ownership. I plot the evolution of institu-
tional ownership in this figure. The institutional investor is defined as an institution or an
individual with an investment purpose or providing financial services by holding at least
5 percent of a firm. According to my definition, this includes investment managers/ad-
visors, hedge funds, private equity firms, commercial banks, financial services, private
investors, insurance, mutual/pension funds, and “other investment entities”. “Other
investment entities” includes firms or organizations that do not easily fit into the other
categories, namely holding companies, principal investment firms, investment companies,
self-management investment trusts, sovereign wealth funds, and real estate investment
trusts (REITs). In the plot, “other inst. investor” include institutional investors other than
investment managers and hedge funds.
institutional investor increased from 75 percent to 94 percent.
Ownership has become more concentrated among institutional investors
from 1994 to 2012. As noted in Table 2.3, in 1994, 60 percent of the firms had
at least one institutional investor, while 95 percent of the firms in 2012 had at
least one institutional investor. The aggregate institutional ownership increased
from 10.46 percent to 26.27 percent over the sample period.7 However, the
7I find a similar trend for the largest institutional ownership, which on average increased
from 6.18 percent to 10.55 percent over the sample period. The largest institutional ownership is
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FIGURE 2.5: Evolution of Institutional Ownership: S&P SmallCap, MidCap,
LargeCap and Ex-S&P 1500 Index. I plot the evolution of institutional ownership
in this figure. The concentration of ownership is fastest in the S&P SmallCap Index.
Besides the firms in the S&P 1500, the Execucomp database also covers some companies
that were once part of the S&P 1500 but removed from the index. For these firms, as
indicated by “Ex-S&P 1500 Firms”, the concentration of ownership is more or less the
same as the S&P SmallCap Index, but faster than the S&P MidCap and S&P LargeCap.
This suggests that the concentration of ownership is a universal phenomenon and is
not only applicable to the firms in the S&P 1500 index. The institutional investor is
defined as an institution or an individual with an investment purpose or providing
financial services by holding at least 5 percent of a firm. According to my definition, this
includes investment managers/advisors, hedge funds, private equity firms, commercial
banks, financial services, private investors, insurance, mutual/pension funds, and “other
investment entities”. “Other investment entities” includes firms or organizations that do
not easily fit into the other categories, namely holding companies, principal investment
firms, investment companies, self-management investment trusts, sovereign wealth funds,
and real estate investment trusts (REITs).
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increase in institutional ownership is not evenly distributed. As Figure 2.4
shows, investment manager ownership has experienced the sharpest increase
during the sample period. For hedge funds, there was an upward trend before
the financial crisis in 2008 and a downward trend thereafter. It seems that
the financial crisis in 2008 inflicted a temporary shock on investment manager
ownership, but a permanent shock on the hedge fund ownership. Ownership
held by other institutional investors remained relatively stable over the same
time period. The details of each type of ownership are elaborated in Table 2.4.
Passive management such as index tracking has gained popularity since the
1990s (Mamudi 2009). However, I find that the concentration of ownership is a
universal phenomenon and is not only applicable to the firms in the S&P 1500
index. My sample includes all companies in the Execucomp database, which
covers some companies that were once included in the S&P 1500 index, but have
since been removed. As noted in Figure 2.5, the concentration of ownership in
these firms is more or less similar as the S&P SmallCap Index, but faster than
the S&P MidCap and S&P LargeCap.
on average 12 percent when it is present. The average size of the founding-family ownership
(≥ 5 percent) is 14.27 (20.91) percent when it is present. I elaborate on the evolution of the
largest institutional ownership in Table 2.3. In the literature, Holderness (2009) documents
that the average size of the largest block is 26 percent where block ownership is present for a
random sample of U.S. firms. Becht (2001) reports that the median size of the largest block for
a representative sample of firms in the NYSE is 5.4 percent and for NASDAQ firms it was 8.6
percent.
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TABLE 2.4: Evolution of Institutional Ownership Over Time. I present evolution of institutional ownership over time in this table. I elaborate on the definition
of the institutional ownership in Table 2.2. Institutional Investor is defined as an institution or an individual with an investment purpose or providing financial
services by holding at least 5 percent of the firm. In my definition, it includes investment managers/advisors (invest. manager), hedge funds, private equity firms
(PE), commercial banks, financial services, private investors, insurance, mutual/pension funds, and other investment entities.
Year N Institutional Investor (Dummy)
Invest. Manager Hedge Fund Fin. Services PE Insurance Bank Mutual/Pension Private Investor Other
Invest. Enti.
1994 870 0.47 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01
1995 1128 0.54 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02
1996 1296 0.57 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01
1997 1650 0.60 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01
1998 1715 0.61 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01
1999 1787 0.64 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01
2000 1685 0.67 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
2001 1644 0.67 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02
2002 1640 0.70 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02
2003 1688 0.72 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02
2004 1729 0.76 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02
2005 1762 0.79 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01
2006 1632 0.81 0.22 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01
2007 1744 0.83 0.25 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01
2008 1878 0.83 0.31 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01
2009 1828 0.85 0.26 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
2010 1799 0.90 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02
2011 1727 0.91 0.23 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
2012 1488 0.91 0.25 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
Overall 30,690 0.74 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
To be Continued
Continued
Year N Institutional Ownership (in Percentage)
Invest. Manager Hedge Fund Fin. Services PE Insurance Bank Mutual/Pension Private Investor Other
Invest. Enti.
1994 870 6.33 0.63 0.50 0.58 1.03 0.77 0.23 0.17 0.14
1995 1128 7.68 0.53 0.47 0.58 1.26 0.68 0.22 0.21 0.17
1996 1296 7.83 0.61 0.57 0.68 1.11 0.67 0.26 0.21 0.17
1997 1650 8.87 0.67 0.77 1.12 1.18 0.62 0.29 0.18 0.13
1998 1715 9.91 0.72 0.78 1.14 1.09 0.59 0.31 0.19 0.10
1999 1787 10.12 0.74 0.84 1.25 1.00 0.61 0.30 0.18 0.09
2000 1685 10.88 0.85 0.70 1.44 1.00 0.47 0.30 0.22 0.20
2001 1644 10.83 1.08 0.59 1.49 0.93 0.57 0.47 0.27 0.22
2002 1640 11.73 1.30 0.56 1.34 0.96 0.47 0.46 0.18 0.23
2003 1688 12.25 1.64 0.58 1.42 1.00 0.51 0.54 0.22 0.22
2004 1729 12.69 1.67 0.72 1.41 0.79 0.57 0.58 0.25 0.25
2005 1762 13.69 2.06 0.76 1.17 0.79 0.54 0.61 0.30 0.24
2006 1632 14.46 2.44 0.81 0.95 0.79 0.38 0.53 0.26 0.24
2007 1744 15.65 2.91 0.92 0.99 0.75 0.37 0.42 0.20 0.18
2008 1878 16.50 3.82 1.05 1.49 0.95 0.51 0.40 0.21 0.23
2009 1828 16.05 3.13 0.95 1.37 0.75 0.49 0.43 0.26 0.28
2010 1799 17.80 2.63 0.84 1.52 0.59 0.33 0.36 0.30 0.20
2011 1727 18.21 2.59 0.98 1.21 0.40 0.28 0.43 0.30 0.36
2012 1488 19.39 2.88 1.04 1.15 0.39 0.21 0.35 0.32 0.36
Overall 30,690 13.02 1.81 0.78 1.21 0.87 0.50 0.40 0.23 0.21
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FIGURE 2.6: Distribution of Institutional Investor. There are 30,690 observations in my sample.
I present a bivariate histogram to show the distribution of institutional investor number over the
calendar year in (a). Firms with 9 or more institutional investors are included in the same category. It
is noteworthy that my sample period ranges from 1 January 1994 to 6 August 2012. In 2012, firms that
submitted their proxy filings after 6 August 2012 are not included in my sample. I calculate the mean
and standard error of Tobin’s Q for firms with the same number of institutional investors. I plot them
over the number in the (b).
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FIGURE 2.7: Ownership Characteristics. I present the characteristics of each type of
ownership in this figure. The bubble size indicates the frequencies of the institutional
investor, as documented in the Table 2.2. I calculate average firm age, Tobin’s Q, and
ownership life cycle for the firms where one type of ownership is present. I plot them
over ownership in (a), (b) and (c), respectively. I calculate Tobin’s Q by using data in the
Compustat FUNDA database. I consider the difference between the proxy filing date
and the date of the beginning stock data, which is the number of days each stock was
included in the CRSP database, as a proxy for the firm age. For each blockholder, I trace
its evolution over time and calculate its ownership life cycle in the company, which is
the period from the owner’s initial acquisition to its complete sale in order to measure its
stability. I assume that the time of acquisition and the sale of the ownership are evenly
distributed. It follows that the expected acquisition time is half a year before the proxy
filing date at which ownership is observed for the first time, while the expected sale date
is half a year later than the proxy filing date at which ownership is observed for the last
time. The ownership life cycle is the difference between the expected sale date and the
expected acquisition date. My approach underestimates the ownership life cycle if the
acquisition or disposition time is beyond the sample period.
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The dramatic change in the ownership structure has given birth to a corporate
governance structure that is characterized of multiple blockholders—that is, as
the Figure 2.6 (a) shows, the number of firms with 0 or 1 institutional investor
experienced a downward trend, while the number of firms with 3 or more in-
stitutional investors experienced a dramatic upward trend during the last two
decades. As noted in Table 2.3, the average number of institutional investors
increased from 1.21 to 3.25. Moreover, as documented in Figure 2.6 (b), the
institutional ownership is negatively associated with firm’s performance, which
is measured by Tobin’s Q. This suggests that an ownership structure with multi-
ple institutional investors tends to be formed in firms with poor performance.
My findings are consistent with Laeven and Levine (2007). They document a
negative relationship between cash-flow rights dispersion and Tobin’s Q for a
cross section of 1,657 firms across 13 countries in Western Europe.
Different types of ownership exhibit different characteristics, as noted in
Figure 2.7. Founding-family ownership and corporation ownership tend to
stay in younger firms. Firms with private equity ownership are the youngest.
Firms with founding-family ownership have the highest Tobin’s Q. Firms with
an employee ownership plan are the oldest and have the lowest Tobin’s Q.
Founding-family ownership has the longest life cycle among all the different
types of ownership. As Table 2.2 shows, the average life cycle of founding-family
ownership is 8.78 years, compared to institutional ownership which is only
2.61 years. In the 1980s, institutional ownership replaced family ownership to
become the most prevalent large shareholder within major U.S. public companies.
This suggests that the stability of the ownership structure of major U.S. public
companies, which is measured by the ownership life cycle, is significantly less
today than before.
The ownership structure of major U.S. public companies exhibits several
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unique characteristics, which seem to help institutional investors and founding-
families achieve a balance between liquidity and control. First, although institu-
tional investors together hold a significant stake in the firm, each institutional
investor holds only a relatively small stake. In 2012, there were 3.25 institutional
investors that owned 26.27 percent of the firm within major U.S. public com-
panies. The second characteristic is that in many U.S. firms founding-family
ownership and institutional ownership co-exist. In 2012, 23 percent of the major
U.S. public companies have founding-family ownership. The third characteristic
is that in the U.S. founding-families tend to hold more shares than an average
institutional investor, but these families also tend to hold less than the aggregate
number of shares held by institutional investors. When founding-family owner-
ship is present, they tend to hold on average 14 percent of the firm. This is above
the ownership held by an average institutional investor, but well below the
aggregate ownership held by all institutional investors. Previous studies (e.g.,
Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; Becht and Mayer 2001) have not
shown similar characteristics for firms in the East Asian and Western European
countries. For instance, Becht and Mayer (2001) report that more than 50 percent
of European companies have a single block of shareholders that commands a
majority of shares. Claessens et al. (2000) document using a sample of 2,980
corporations in 9 East Asian countries that older firms are generally family-
controlled. By contrast, I find that founding-family ownership is more likely to
appear in younger major U.S. public companies.
However, an ownership structure that is characterized by multiple institu-
tional investors that have a significantly shorter ownership life cycle is inherently
unstable because of information asymmetry among institutional investors. Pre-
vious studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. 1992; Devenow and Welch 1996; Nofsinger
and Sias 1999; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Sias 2004) have shown that institutions
herd as a result of inferring information from each other’s trades. A blockholder
32
Chapter 2. The Extinction of Widely Held Public Companies
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f F
irm
s H
av
in
g 
a 
La
rg
e 
Sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r
       0%
      10%
      20%
      30%
      40%
      50%
      60%
      70%
      80%
Calendar Year
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fidelity Management & Research (FMR)
BlackRock
Barclays Global Investors
FIGURE 2.8: Percentage of Firms where FMR or BlackRock is a Large Share-
holder. Two institutional investors have become remarkably powerful. These investors
are: Fidelity Management and Research (FMR) which makes up 9.1 percent and BlackRock
which makes up 4.5 percent of the overall institutional investors, as noted in Table 2.5. I
plot over time in this figure the percentage of the firms where FMR or BlackRock is one of
the large shareholders, namely holding at least 5 percent of the firm. Blackrock acquired
Barclay Global Capital in 2009. In 2012, BlackRock and FMR were the large shareholder in
72 percent and 24 percent of the 1,488 companies used in my sample, respectively.
cannot tell by observing the liquidation of other blockholders whether it is about
private information or the idiosyncratic liquidity shock when a blockholder sells
his block. Liquidation can then become a self-fulfilling process and can lead
to a chain reaction. Potential systemic failure, namely liquidation can lead to a
chain reaction, is exacerbated by the fact that two institutional investors have be-
come remarkably powerful. These include: Fidelity Management and Research
(FMR) and BlackRock. As presented in Table 2.5, FMR makes up 9.1 percent and
BlackRock 4.5 percent of the overall institutional investors. In 2012, as presented
in Figure 2.8, BlackRock and FMR held 5 percent or even more of a firm in 72
percent and 24 percent of the 1,488 companies used in my sample, respectively.
The failure of a powerful institutional investor, such as BlackRock or FMR, could
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lead to a chain reaction, which ultimately could pose a serious concern to the
financial system. Financial institutions were thought to be powerless (e.g., Jensen
1989; Coffee 1991; Chaganti and Damanour 1991). However, my results show
that the strength of the financial institutions rather than their weakness may be
of public concern today and in the future.
2.4 Evolution of the Ownership Structure
2.4.1 Firm Performance and Ownership Structure
I study the evolution of ownership structure by using both fixed effect and
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM model.8 Helwege et al. (2007) show that
the market for a firm’s stock and its stock’s market performance are critical
determinants of the evolution of its ownership. Therefore, I consider firm’s per-
formance, which is measured by Tobin’s Q, as the main explanatory variable in
my analysis. Blockholders may adopt different investment strategies in response
to a firm’s performance. One major difference between institutional investors
and founding-families is that institution investors are diversified and they are
capable of conducting sophisticated trading strategies in order to limit their
downside risk, while founding-families are usually not diversified (Anderson
and Reeb 2003) and take less risk than non-family firms (Naldi et al. 2007).
As a result, institutional investors and founding-families may adopt different
investment strategies, which in turn have a different impact on the evolution of
ownership structure.
8The macroeconomic background of the evolution of ownership structure is that the financial
sector has grown enormously during the last 30 years (Greenwood and Scharfstein 2013). The
fraction of the equity market owned directly by individuals has declined significantly since a
reduction in noise trading (Stambaugh 2014). This decline in individual ownership continues
a trend that began essentially at the end of World War II, when households held more than 90
percent of U.S. corporate equity (Rydqvist et al. 2014). Legal institutions also have a significant
impact on a firm’s ownership structure, as shown by the dramatic increase in institutional
ownership in the health care industry when legal constraints are eliminated.
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TABLE 2.5: Top Ten Institutional Investors. For each type of institutional investor, I report top ten institutional investors and their frequencies in the
sample. As noted by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), blockholder name could be disclosed differently across years or firms. I manually correct the
blockholder name by assigning a uniform name to the blockholders disclosed differently across years or firms.
Institutional Investor (Top 10)
Investment Manager Hedge Fund Insurance
Name Freq. Name Freq. Name Freq.
Fidelity Mgmt. & Research (FMR) 7,372 Royce & Associates 1,028 AXA 949
BlackRock 3,619 GAMCO 675 Prudential 477
Capital Group Companies 3,197 Third Avenue Mgmt. 167 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance 274
Barclays Global Investors 2,952 Renaissance Technologies 148 Equitable Companies 184
Dimensional Fund Advisors 2,702 Iridian Asset Mgmt. 113 John Hancock 45
T Rowe Price 2,526 Pzena Investment Mgmt. LLC 90 Cincinnati Financial Corporation 44
Wellington Capital Mgmt. 2,314 Newsouth Capital Mgmt. 76 Loews Corporation 39
Vanguard 1,804 Prescott Investors 76 Guardian Life Insurance Company of America 34
Franklin Templeton Investments 947 Highfields Capital Mgmt. 67 Metropolitan Life Insurance 32
Putnam 922 Citadel 64 State Farm Insurance Companies 29
Total 28,355 Total 2,504 Total 2,107
Financial Services Mutual/Pension Bank
Name Freq. Name Freq. Name Freq.
State Street Bank & Trust Co 426 Dodge & Cox 386 Citigroup 226
Wells Fargo & Co 346 Ariel Investment 333 Bank of America 210
J P Morgan Chase & Co 234 Columbia Wagner Asset Mgmt. LP 110 Mellon Bank 166
J P Morgan & Co 195 Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP 59 Barclays Bank PLC 118
State Street Corp 182 Vanguard Fiduciary Trust 59 The Bank of New York Mellon Corp 95
Deutsche Bank 163 Growth Fund of America Inc 51 SunTrust Bank 64
William Blair & Co LLC 156 Small Cap World Fund Inc 48 Norwest Corporation 58
American Express Company 142 Federated Equity Fundsd 34 ING Groep NV 38
Lazard Freres & Co 117 Scudder Stevens & Clark Inc 34 Barclays Private Bank 29
Wachovia Corp 108 Berger Small Cap Value 28 Chase Manhattan 27
Total 2,069 Total 1,142 Total 1,031
To Be Continued
Continued
Private Equity Other Invest. Enti. Private Investor
Name Freq. Name Freq. Name Freq.
Private Capital Mgmt. 343 Berkshire Hathaway 194 John R Simplot 43
AIM Capital Mgmt., Ltd 160 Crane Fund 21 Carl C Icahn 38
Warburg Pincus & Co 134 GE 19 MSD Capital Inc 29
Blum Capital Partners Lp 71 Leucadia National Corporation 18 Joseph L Harrosh 26
KKR 44 AEW Capital Mgmt. 12 Carl E Berg 25
Apollo 37 Trust Partnership 12 Lloyd I Miller III 20
Technology Crossover Ventures 37 Orient Star Holdings LLC 9 Sumner M Redstone 19
OrbiMed Advisors 33 Adelante Capital Mgmt. LLC 8 George Gund III 16
Palisade Capital Mgmt. LLC 30 Alleghany Corporation 8 H Wayne Huizenga 16
Thomas H. Lee Partners 27 Giddeon Holdings 8 J Hyatt Brown 16
Total 916 Total 309 Total 248
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2.4.1.1 Fixed Effect Estimation
I consider blockholder ownership as the dependent variable and explain it using
a two-way fixed effect model. I find that the evolution of institutional ownership
and founding-family ownership within a firm is strongly related to the firm’s
performance, but in an opposite way. In specification (1) and (2) in Panel A of
Table 2.6, the negative coefficient of the Tobin’s Q suggests that the institutional
investor tends to target undervalued firms—that is, it increases (decreases) its
position when a firm’s performance is bad (good). By contrast, I document a
positive and significant coefficient of Tobin’s Q for founding-family ownership
in specification (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table 2.6, suggesting that they tend to
increase (decrease) their positions when growth opportunity is high (low). The
negative and significant coefficient of Tobin’s Q in specification (5) and (6) in
Panel A of Table 2.6 suggests that employee ownership plans tend to emerge in
industries and firms with lower growth opportunities. The association between
corporation ownership and firm performance is weak, as indicated by specifi-
cation (7) and (8) in Panel A, which confirms my conjecture that it serves for a
purpose other than investment. In order to relieve the concern that the causal
direction is the opposite, that is, institutional ownership damages firm perfor-
mance, while family ownership improves firm performance, I include Tobin’s
Q lagged one year as an explanatory variable in Panel B. As the Table shows,
the coefficient of lagged Tobin’s Q is negative and significant in specification (1)
and (2), and positive and significant in specification (3) and (4). The opposite
causal direction is less likely to be true. I also consider the firm’s accounting
performance measure (ROA) as an explanatory variable in section 2.6 as a ro-
bustness check. As Table 2.11 shows, my results are robust under the alternative
performance measure.
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Fixed effect estimation can potentially ameliorate the bias arising from un-
observable heterogeneity. However, the estimation of current values of the
dependent variable on explanatory variable would be negatively (positively)
biased if the explanatory variable is positively (negatively) related to past values
of the dependent variable (Nickell 1981; Wintoki et al. 2012). The estimation of
employee and corporation ownership is less likely to have this bias as firms take
strategies responsive to controlling shareholders’ goals and expectations and the
impact of a small stake on a firm’s performance, if any, is limited. Moreover, pre-
vious studies (e.g., Blasi 1996) have shown that there is no connection between
employee ownership and performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue
that there is no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and
firm performance.
2.4.1.2 Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation
However, there is also empirical evidence regarding the relation between owner-
ship structure and firm value (e.g., Morck et al. 1988a; McConnell and Servaes
1990; Holderness et al. 1999; Lemmon and Lins 2003). Moreover, previous
studies such as Brickley et al. (1988), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), Bushee
(1998), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Almazan et al. (2005), and Borokhovich et al.
(2006) have shown that certain types of institutional investors exert influence
on anti-takeover amendments, R&D investment decisions and CEO compen-
sation, which could have a long-run effect on firm performance. In order to
further relieve the concern that a firm’s performance could be influenced by past
ownership structure, I estimate the relation between institutional ownership
and firm performance using a dynamic GMM panel estimator. This estimator
was introduced by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The
dynamic modeling approach has been used in areas where there could be a
dynamic relation between dependent and explanatory variables. Examples in
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TABLE 2.6: Evolution of Ownership Structure (Fixed Effect Model). Institutional Investor is de-
fined as an institution or an individual with an investment purpose or providing financial services
by holding at least 5 percent of the firm. In my definition, it includes investment managers/advisors
(invest. manager), hedge funds, private equity firms (PE), commercial banks, financial services, private
investors, insurance, mutual/pension funds, and other investment entities. Post Crisis Dummy is a
dummy variable and equals 1 when the proxy filing date is later than Jan 1, 2009. Total Asset (AT)
and Tobin’s Q are taken from or calculated by using the data in the Compustat FUNDA database.
Volatility is defined as the annualized standard deviation of the stock returns in the period between
two proxy filing dates. I consider a two-way fixed effect model, namely industry and time fixed effect
in specification (1), (3), (5), and (7), and firm and time fixed effect in specification (2), (4), (6), and (8),
to perform the analysis.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Ownership (in Percentage)
Institutional Investor Founding-Family Employee Ownership Corporation Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Assets (Ln) -1.842 -3.102 -0.629 -0.587 0.074 -0.007 0.034 -0.271
(30.17)*** (15.97)*** (16.14)*** (8.56)*** (7.13)*** -0.310 -1.350 (3.83)***
Tobin’s Q -0.762 -0.475 0.228 0.052 -0.033 -0.011 0.012 0.071
(9.38)*** (6.12)*** (5.13)*** (2.67)*** (4.55)*** (4.90)*** -0.320 (1.75)*
Volatility 3.656 1.301 -1.084 0.630 -0.433 -0.191 2.047 1.299
(6.55)*** (2.36)** (3.74)*** (4.44)*** (6.34)*** (3.28)*** (8.55)*** (6.90)***
Post Crisis Dummy 1.686 -0.544 -0.068 -0.240
(3.85)*** (3.87)*** -1.250 (1.80)*
Observations 30280 30280 30280 30280 30280 30280 30280 30280
R-squared 0.2 0.61 0.07 0.91 0.04 0.75 0.04 0.66
Industry Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Ownership (in Percentage)
Institutional Investor Founding-Family Employee Ownership Corporation Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Assets (Ln) -1.934 -3.097 -0.608 -0.48 0.08 0.003 0.021 -0.24
(30.21)*** (14.77)*** (15.09)*** (6.98)*** (7.44)*** -0.13 -0.86 (3.33)***
Tobin’s Q (-1) -0.685 -0.299 0.207 0.03 -0.036 -0.012 -0.018 0.064
(8.89)*** (5.31)*** (4.97)*** (1.80)* (5.02)*** (5.06)*** -0.5 -1.53
Volatility 4.416 1.691 -1.43 0.499 -0.389 -0.19 1.704 1.018
(7.31)*** (2.85)*** (4.98)*** (3.74)*** (5.53)*** (3.02)*** (7.49)*** (6.12)***
Post Crisis Dummy 1.768 -0.532 -0.069 -0.193
(4.00)*** (3.94)*** -1.24 -1.43
Observations 27186 27186 27186 27186 27186 27186 27186 27186
R-squared 0.2 0.63 0.08 0.92 0.05 0.76 0.04 0.69
Industry Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
39
Chapter 2. The Extinction of Widely Held Public Companies
corporate finance include Hoechle et al. (2012) and Wintoki et al. (2012), among
others. I estimate following dynamic panel GMM model:
yit = α +
∑
s
δsyit−s +
∑
s
βsXit−s + ηi + it (2.1)
where yit is the ownership, it is a random error term and βs is the effect of factor
such as firm performance on ownership. I follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and
allow the dependent variable to adjust with delay to changes in factors such as
firms’ performance, size, volatility and payout policy. The process of adjustment
to changes in these factors may depend both on the passage of time, which
indicates lagged versions of these factors as regressors, and on the difference
between equilibrium institutional ownership level and the previous year’s actual
level, which argues for a dynamic model, in which lags of the dependent variable
are also regressors. I execute the estimation by using xtabond2 in Stata (Roodman
2009), which enables me to estimate the ownership/performance relation while
including both past ownership and fixed effect to account for the dynamic
aspects of ownership/performance relation and time-invariant unobservable
heterogeneity, respectively. I use the system GMM estimator in the estimation.
I use the firm’s history beyond t − s as instruments for the explanatory
variables. The lagged variables are valid instruments under the assumption of
sequential exogeneity, which implies that current shocks are independent of past
values of dependent variables (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988; Arellano and Bond 1991;
Wintoki et al. 2012):
E(it|Xi,t−s, ..., Xi,1) = 0 (2.2)
I utilize the fact that the average life cycle of institutional investor within a firm is
2.61 years and include 2 lags (s = 2) in my regression. It is economically justified
to consider dependent variables lagged 2 or more years as instruments since
institutional ownership in the history that is older than 2 years were on average
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held by different institutional investors, which have no direct effect on current
institutional ownership; 2 lags of past institutional ownership is sufficient to
capture the influence of the firm’s past on the present. Any information from the
firm’s history that is older than 2 years has no direct effect on current institutional
ownership and only affects institutional ownership through its effect on current
firm performance within s time periods. The firm’s history beyond period t− s
should be exogenous with respect to any shocks or surprises to institutional
ownership in the current or future periods.
As noted in Table 2.7, the coefficient of current Tobin’s Q is negative and
significant at the 5 percent level in specification (1) and (2), suggesting that
institutional ownership, especially investment manager, targets undervalued
firms. For other institutional investors, the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is negative
but insignificant. The coefficient of firm’s past performance tends to be positive.
This suggests that institutional investors increase more positions in response to
current negative shock when a firm’s past performance is good. I also report the
results of the specification tests—AR (2) second-order serial correlation tests and
the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions. For instance, in specification
(1), the AR (2) test yields a p-value of 0.39 which means that I cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. The results in specification
(1) in Table 2.7 also reveal a J-statistic with a p-value of 0.58 and as such, I cannot
reject the hypothesis that my instruments are valid.
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TABLE 2.7: Evolution of Ownership Structure (Dynamic Panel GMM Model). I present the estima-
tion results of the dynamic panel GMM model specified in equation 2.1. Firm age (ln) = ln(1+firm age).
I execute the regression using xtabond2 in Stata (Roodman 2009). I consider all explanatory variables
lagged three or more periods, except Tobin’s Q, as instruments. I invoke the “collapse” option of
xtabond2 to limit instrument proliferation.
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership (in Percentage)
Inst. Own Invst. Manager Hedge Fund PE Other
Tobin’s Q -3.167 -2.137 -0.639 -0.202 -0.582
(2.06)** (1.96)** -1.06 -0.52 -0.72
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 0.518 -1.129 0.116 -0.313 1.324
-0.3 -0.81 -0.2 -0.78 -1.52
Tobin’s Q (t-2) 1.772 1.667 0.581 0.162 0.332
-1.5 (1.94)* -1.25 -0.52 -0.62
Total Asset (Ln) 5.841 11.025 -4.849 -0.409 -5.291
-0.71 (1.68)* (1.85)* -0.16 -1.54
Total Asset (Ln) (t-1) -12.816 -9.654 4.999 0.469 0.728
-0.96 -0.95 -1.25 -0.13 -0.15
Total Asset (Ln) (t-2) 4.85 -2.715 -1.495 0.143 4.317
-0.56 -0.4 -0.54 -0.08 -1.41
Volatility 7.372 9.914 0.414 3.723 -2.578
-1.09 (1.77)* -0.16 (2.08)** -0.83
Volatility (t-1) -14.915 -11.373 -3.784 -1.026 -4.176
-1.62 -1.47 -1 -0.36 -1.13
Volatility (t-2) 3.198 3.104 1.502 -0.376 0.9
-0.59 -0.73 -0.64 -0.23 -0.42
Share Repo/Total Payout -0.106 -0.107 -0.011 -0.019 -0.023
(1.89)* (2.31)** -0.57 -1.6 -1.01
Share Repo/Total Payout (t-1) 0.047 0.063 -0.017 0.022 -0.012
-0.97 -1.47 -0.95 (2.02)** -0.62
Share Repo/Total Payout (t-2) 0.029 0.048 0.022 0.002 0.007
-0.86 -1.49 (1.82)* -0.18 -0.53
Inst. Own (t-1) 0.916
(5.25)***
Inst. Own (t-2) -0.118
-1.09
Invst. Manager (t-1) 0.631
(3.81)***
Invst. Manager (t-2) 0.035
-0.36
Hedge Fund (t-1) 0.724
(3.77)***
Hedge Fund (t-2) -0.02
-0.15
PE (t-1) 1.009
(4.78)***
PE (t-2) -0.209
-1.37
Other Ownership (t-1) 0.692
(3.66)***
Other Ownership (t-2) 0.014
-0.12
Firm age (Ln) 0.239 0.062 0.761 -0.191 -0.299
-0.2 -0.06 -1.42 -0.53 -0.46
AR(1) test P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) test P-value 0.39 0.44 0.96 0.25 0.93
Hansen test of over-identification 0.58 0.47 0.13 0.95 0.20
(p-value)
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity 0.78 0.82 0.16 0.96 0.21
(p-value) 0.78 0.82 0.16 0.96 0.21
Observations 22673 22673 22673 22673 22673
Number of GVKEY 2788 2788 2788 2788 2788
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The assumption of sequential exogeneity in equation 2.2 cannot be economi-
cally justified for founding-family ownership, which has an average life cycle of
8.78 years. Previous studies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2006) have shown that
the most symptomatic of the cultural constraints within family firms are the
inheritance rules that govern many of these firms. Past founding-family owner-
ship could have a persistent and direct impact on current ownership level. This
suggests that it is not justified to use lagged values of the dependent variable
and endogenous regressors as instruments for family ownership. I consider
the standard event study approach to relieve the concern that the estimation of
founding-family ownership is biased in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.2 Interactions among Different Types of Ownership
The interaction among different types of ownership determines which type of
ownership will survive in a firm’s ownership structure. In this section, I examine
the interaction between institutional investors and founding-families, which
contribute 57.9 percent and 23.1 percent of the overall blockholders, as noted in
Table 2.2, respectively.
I apply standard event study methodology and calculate the abnormal changes
in the founding-family ownership around the first-time appearance of institu-
tional ownership in the firm’s ownership structure. I consider the first-time
appearance of institutional ownership since this condition suggests a dramatic
change in the firm’s ownership structure and this is also when direct interac-
tion between different types of ownership is most likely to occur. In the event
window, year 0 indicates the calendar year of the proxy filing when institu-
tional ownership is observed for the first time. The firm is required to have
founding-family ownership in event year -1. There are 236 events overall. Of the
236 companies, 130 (or 55 percent) have a family CEO; 82 percent of the family
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CEOs are the founders, and the remaining 18 percent are the descendants of the
founders. On average, the founding-family holds 20 percent of the firm in event
year -1. In event year 0, there are 369 institutional investors entering the 236
firms, 259 of them are investment managers, and 28 of them are hedge funds.
Investment managers and hedge funds together contribute 77.78 percent of the
overall institutional investors. I calculate the cumulative abnormal change in
founding-family ownership as:
CAOWN (Family Own)(t1, t2) (2.3)
=
∑t2
t=t1
(Family Owni,t − Family Owni,t−1)− (Family Ownt − Family Ownt−1)
Founding-families have life cycles (Franks et al. 2012) and can regularly sell
shares for liquidity. Therefore, family ownership can naturally decline as time
passes. I calculate the Family Ownt by averaging the founding-family ownership
for all firms in my sample at time t, and consider it as the normal founding-
family ownership at t. Similarly, I calculate the cumulative abnormal change in
the family CEO ratio as:
CACEO (Family CEO)(t1, t2) (2.4)
=
∑t2
t=t1
(Family CEOt − Family CEOt−1)− (Family CEOt − Family CEOt−1)
I calculate the Family CEOt in a similar way and consider it as the normal family
CEO ratio at t. I plot the interaction between founding-family ownership and
institutional ownership in Figure 2.9. As Figure 2.9 shows, there is a significant
abnormal decrease in founding-family ownership and the family CEO ratio
around the time in which institutional ownership enters the firm’s ownership
structure for the first time. The cumulative abnormal change in founding-family
ownership in the time window [-1,0] and [-1,5] is -1.41 percent and -6.05 percent
on average, respectively. Both of them are significant at the 1 percent level. The
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cumulative abnormal change in the family CEO ratio in the time window [-1,0]
and [-1,5] is -0.01 percent and -16.5 percent, respectively. In the time window
[-1,5], the change is significant at the 1 percent level.
The abnormal decrease in founding-family ownership and the family CEO ra-
tio is strongly associated with subsequent acquisition. I calculate the percentage
of firms being acquired in the event window. I consider the percentage of the
S&P 1500 firms being acquired in the event window as the normal percentage of
firms being acquired. As Figure 2.10 shows, 18.41 percent of the 236 firms were
acquired in the next five years, compared on average only 8.58 percent of the
S&P 1500 firms were acquired. In most cases, the bidders are corporations in a
related industry. My results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Martin
and McConnell 1991; Hartzell et al. 2004). The CEOs of target firms are usually
removed in takeovers. When family CEOs are replaced, they usually dispose
their ownership. In my sample, 40 percent of the firms were acquired in the end.
The acquisition occurs in event year 6 on average.
2.4.2.1 Caveat and Alternative Explanations
The causal direction tends to be clear since subsequent third-party acquisitions,
which are significantly facilitated by institutional ownership, are the main reason
for the abnormal change in founding-family ownership and the family CEO ratio.
However, the opposite casual direction, that is, the voluntary quit of incumbent
family is the reason why institutional blockholders enter into the firm and
subsequent acquisition, is also possible. However, we can neither confirm nor
reject this possibility since we cannot determine whether the incumbent families
were voluntary or involuntary when they quit. I argue that the opposite causal
direction is less likely to true for three reasons. First, poor firm performance,
relative to what it could be with more efficient management, is the main reason
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FIGURE 2.9: Interactions between Institutional and Founding-family Owner-
ship. I apply standard event study methodology and calculate the abnormal changes in
the founding-family ownership around the first-time appearance of institutional owner-
ship in the firm’s ownership structure. I consider the first-time appearance of institutional
ownership since this condition suggests a dramatic change in the firm’s ownership struc-
ture and this is also when direct interaction between different types of ownership is most
likely to occur. In the event window, year 0 indicates the calendar year of the proxy
filing when institutional ownership is observed for the first time. The firm is required to
have founding-family ownership in event year -1. There are 236 events overall. Of the
236 companies, 130 (or 55 percent) have a family CEO. On average, the founding-family
holds 20 percent of the firm in event year -1. In event year 0, there are 369 institutional
investors entering the 236 firms, 259 of them are investment managers, and 28 of them are
hedge funds. Investment managers and hedge funds together contribute 77.78 percent
of the overall institutional investors. In event year 0, on average, institutional investors
held 11.62 percent. I calculate the cumulative abnormal change in the founding-family
ownership and in the family CEO ratio as equation 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. I find that
the cumulative abnormal change in founding-family ownership during the time window
[-1,5] is -6.05 percent on average, while the cumulative abnormal change in the family
CEO ratio during the time window [-1,5] is -16.5 percent. Both of them are significant at
the 1 percent level.
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FIGURE 2.10: Institutional Ownership and Acquisition. I calculate the percentage
of firms being acquired around the first-time appearance of institutional ownership in the
firm’s ownership structure. I consider the average percentage of S&P 1500 firms being
acquired across the 236 observations as a benchmark indicating the normal percentage of
firms being acquired. There are 236 firms in my sample in event year 0; 18.41 percent of
the 236 firms were acquired in the next five years, compared on average there are only
8.58 percent of firms in the S&P 1500 are acquired during the same period.
why firms are acquired (e.g., Manne 1965; Palepu 1985; Morck et al. 1988b,
1989). Second, a liquidity constraint or shock, which might drive the quit of a
family, should be perceived as a signal of its incompetence since a founding-
family is usually not diversified and its wealth is highly linked to the firm’s
performance. Third, previous studies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2006) have
shown that the most symptomatic of the cultural constraints within family firms
are the inheritance rules that govern many of these firms. A founding-family
has incentive to keep their family name and is less likely to voluntarily quit.
This probably occurs when the founder suddenly dies and there is no suitable or
designated successor. I do not find any evidence in my study to suggest that this
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happens.
One possibility is that some unobserved factors may drive both the formation
of institutional ownership and subsequent acquisition, suggesting that a target
firm will be acquired anyway, no matter institutional ownership is present or not.
However, whatever the institutional investor’s initial purpose, the presence of
institutional ownership increases the probability of firms being acquired ex-post.
First, it is very costly to acquire a company with a diffused ownership structure,
since the bidder has to pay the expected gains under his management to the
shareholders, who can otherwise free ride on the bidder’s improvement of the
corporation (Grossman and Hart 1980). The presence of multiple blockholders
mitigates the free rider problem. Second, the presence of blockholders facili-
tates the formation of a toehold which makes a bidder has an incentive to bid
aggressively (Bulow et al. 1999). For a bidder, it is less costly to form a toehold
by negotiating with two or three blockholders than buying them from small
shareholders who tend to free ride each other.9 Another possibility is that insti-
tutional investors may tend to target firms with a greater probability of being
acquired in the future rather than firms that are undervalued. I take the view
that the stock market is efficient and stock price already includes information on
the probability of being acquired in the future.
2.4.3 Summary and Discussion
Taken together, the evolution of ownership structure is shaped by investment
strategies of blockholders and the interactions among them. The investment
strategies adopted by institutional investors and founding-families and the
interaction between them can be seen has having contributed to the development
of the ownership structure of major U.S. public companies—that is, institutional
9Previous studies such as Bulow et al. (1999) have shown that a large percentage of bidders
own toeholds, often of 10-20 percent or more, at the time they make offers.
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FIGURE 2.11: Institutional Investor and Founding-family Ownership. There are
30,690 observations in my sample. I calculate the average founding-family ownership
for firms with the same number of institutional investors. I plot average founding-family
ownership over institutional investor number in the figure.
ownership tends to be formed in firms with poor performance and founding-
family ownership is more likely to be observed in well-performing ones. The
evolution of ownership structure is a dynamic and endogenous process, in
which the firm’s performance in the stock market is a critical determinant. The
ownership structure cannot be taken as exogenous.
My empirical findings also shed light on the dispute that which type of own-
ership structure is more efficient (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983; Demsetz 1983;
Shleifer and Vishny 1997; McConaughy et al. 1998; Anderson and Reeb 2003;
Miller et al. 2007). My results suggest that previous studies about founding-
family ownership could be subject to survivorship bias—that is, incompetent
founding-families are replaced by institutional investors and the firms no longer
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exist as family firms. The potential survivorship bias may lead to overly opti-
mistic estimation of the competence of founding-families. Moreover, the argu-
ment that founding-family ownership represents a more efficient organizational
structure is inconsistent with market efficiency. If founding-family ownership
indeed represents a more efficient ownership structure than institutional own-
ership, then rational institutional investors should invest more in the firms
with founding-family ownership, suggesting that institutional ownership and
founding-family ownership should exhibit a complementary rather than substi-
tute relationship as shown in Figure 2.11. Alchian (1950) notes that whenever
successful enterprises are observed, the elements common to these observable
successes will be associated with success and copied by others in their pursuit or
success. However, in 2012, founding-family ownership reached an all-time low
when compared to the previous two decades. By contrast, according to Shub et
al. (2013), the U.S. investment manager’s asset under management (AuM) has
reached an all-time high of US$36 trillion in 2012.
2.5 Impact of Institutional Ownership on the Board
2.5.1 Event Study Approach
The board of directors in principle monitors management on behalf of sharehold-
ers (Tirole 2005) and therefore, the concentration of ownership should have an
impact on the boards. A firm with founding-family ownership is an ideal place
to evaluate the impact of institutional ownership on board composition, since
there are insider directors, independent directors, family directors, and linked
directors sitting on the board at the same time when institutional ownership
emerges on the scene for the first time. I identify all resigning directors and
newly hired directors in the event window. I present the summary statistics of
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TABLE 2.8: Institutional Ownership and Turnover in the Boards. I examine the turnover
in the board of directors around the first-time appearance of institutional ownership in the
firm’s ownership structure. I consider the first-time appearance of institutional ownership
since this condition suggests a dramatic change in the firm’s ownership structure and this
is also when direct interaction between different types of ownership is most likely to occur.
I identify all resigning directors and newly hired directors in the event window. I present
the summary statistics of the turnover in directors in this table. In the event window, year
0 indicates the calendar year of the proxy filing when institutional ownership is observed
for the first time. The firm is required to have founding-family ownership in event year
-1. There are 236 events overall. I follow Riskmetrics database and classify directors into:
“insider/employee director”, “independent director”, and “linked/affiliated director”. I
manually check whether the director is affiliated with the founding-family and construct
variable “family director”. I identify resigning directors and newly hired directors by
comparing the names of the directors in a row of two years. Those directors showing
in the year t-1 but not in the year t are considered as resigning directors in the year t.
Those directors showing in the year t but not in the year t-1 are considered as newly hired
directors in the year t. Outflow and Inflow in event year t indicate the number of resigning
directors and newly hired directors, respectively.
Director
Event Year Insider/Employee Independent Linked/Affiliated Family
Resign New Resign New Resign New Resign New
(-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+)
-2 12 14 26 42 14 13 7 3
-1 12 14 40 53 15 5 3 6
0 31 28 48 73 19 11 15 6
1 33 25 72 88 21 16 12 4
2 32 26 76 107 25 16 11 5
3 40 35 81 109 31 14 16 5
4 30 28 96 125 30 12 16 4
5 36 19 83 91 31 29 24 4
the turnover in directors in Table 2.8. I find that there is a net inflow of inde-
pendent directors and a net outflow of insider and family directors around the
first-time appearance of institutional ownership.
I apply standard event study methodology and calculate the abnormal changes
in the ratio of insider/employee directors, independent directors, linked direc-
tors and family directors in the same way as equation 2.3. I consider the average
ratio of each type of directors in firms with founding-family ownership as the
normal ratio. I plot the cumulative abnormal change in board composition in
Figure 2.12. As the figure shows, there is a significant increase in the ratio of
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FIGURE 2.12: Impact of Institutional Ownership Over Board Composition. I
apply standard event study methodology and calculate the abnormal changes in the
founding-family ownership around the first-time appearance of institutional ownership
in the firm’s ownership structure. I consider the first-time appearance of institutional
ownership since this condition suggests a dramatic change in the firm’s ownership struc-
ture and this is also when direct interaction between different types of ownership is most
likely to occur. Year 0 indicates the calendar year of the proxy filing when the institutional
ownership is observed for the first time. The firm is required to have founding-family
ownership in event year -1. There are 236 events overall. There are four types of directors
in the RismMetrics database. I calculate the cumulative abnormal change in the ratio of
each type of directors in the same way as the one in the Figure 2.9.
independent directors, and a significant decrease in the ratio of insider/em-
ployee and family directors. In the time window [-1,5], the average cumulative
abnormal change in the ratio of independent directors is 2.2 percent, which is
significant at the 5 percent level. In the time window [-1,5], the average cumula-
tive abnormal change in the ratio of insider/employee and family directors is
-2.4 percent and -1.5 percent, which is significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent
level, respectively.
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FIGURE 2.13: Institutional Investor Number and Board Size. There are 30,690
observations in my sample. I merge my sample with the Riskmetrics database and identify
the board size for 24,899 of them. I calculate mean, median and standard error of board
size for the firms with the same number of institutional investors. I plot the mean (with
standard error) and the median of the board size over the institutional investor number in
the figure.
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FIGURE 2.14: Board’s Link to Investment Manager, Venture Capital, Private Eq-
uity and Hedge Fund. The concentration of ownership towards institutional investors
also changes the board composition in another dimension—that is, it changes the boards’
external network connections. The boards are increasingly externally connected with
institutional investors. I identify the external network connections between boards and
institutional investors using Perl programing language. The board’s link to an institutional
investor is a dummy variable, and equals 1 when there is at least one director sitting on
the board linked to an investment manager, private equity, venture capital, or hedge
fund; otherwise, it is 0. I identify whether a director has a link by searching keywords
“private equity”, “venture capital”, “hedge fund”, and “investment manager/advisor”, in
his or her background information using Perl programing language in the proxy filings.
This rationale of this approach is that all companies are required to disclose background
information about their nominated directors, including relevant history in the company
or industry, positions on other corporate boards, and potential conflicts of interest.
54
Chapter 2. The Extinction of Widely Held Public Companies
2.5.2 Fixed Effect Estimation
In order to evaluate the overall effect of institutional ownership on the boards,
I take the board composition as the dependent variable and explain it using a
two-way fixed effect model. Dynamic panel GMM model may not add extra
benefit since there is no empirical evidence that a dynamic relation between
current blockholder ownership and past board composition exists. I merge my
sample with the Riskmetrics database and identify the board composition and
size for 24,899 of them.
I find that different types of institutional ownership have different impact
on the board composition. As Table 2.9 shows, founding-family ownership
(institutional ownership) is positively (negatively) associated with the ratio of
insider/employee and family director, respectively. The impact on the ratio
of independent director also differs among institutional investors. Investment
manager tends to increase the ratio of independent directors, while hedge fund
has no impact on it. By contrast, other types of institutional ownership tend to
decrease the ratio of independent directors.
Institutional ownership also has an impact on board size, which can be con-
sidered a side effect of the changes in board composition. The net effect on
board size is determined by whether the number of resigning directors is larger
or smaller than the number of newly hired directors. Previous studies (e.g.,
Yermack 1996) have shown that smaller boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs
for poor performance, but that this threat of dismissal declines as the board size
increases. I find that institutional ownership is associated with a smaller board
in Table 2.10 after controlling industry fixed effect. The size-decreasing effect
of institutional ownership on the board is not significant in the firm fixed effect
model, except for the investment manager ownership. I document a negative
55
Chapter 2. The Extinction of Widely Held Public Companies
TABLE 2.9: Impact of Institutional Ownership Over Board Composition (Firm Fixed Effect Model).
I study the impact of institutional ownership on board composition in this table using a two-way firm
and time fixed effect model. I merge my sample with the RiskMetrics database. I follow Riskmetrics
database and classify directors into four types. I consider the percentage of each type of director as the
dependent variable. ROA is rescaled by dividing 100.
Director (Ratio)
Insider Independent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Asset (Ln) -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.71)* (2.24)** (2.53)** (2.15)** -0.160 -0.350 -0.160 -0.050
ROA 2.354 2.200 2.011 2.299 -0.066 0.275 -0.065 -0.442
(3.61)*** (3.37)*** (3.08)*** (3.53)*** -0.070 -0.280 -0.070 -0.450
Employees (Ln) -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
(3.06)*** (3.42)*** (3.48)*** (3.44)*** (1.98)** (2.26)** (2.24)** (2.14)**
Volatility 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018
-0.550 -0.920 -0.910 -0.930 (2.76)*** (3.03)*** (3.06)*** (3.11)***
Firm Age (Ln) -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.010
(3.01)*** (3.51)*** (3.57)*** (3.87)*** (2.15)** (2.32)** (2.69)*** (2.25)**
Founding-Family Ownership 0.220 -0.263
(8.91)*** (10.07)***
Invest. Manager Ownership -0.021 0.046
(3.83)*** (5.31)***
Hedge Fund Ownership -0.089 0.000
(6.04)*** -0.010
Other Inst. Ownership -0.017 -0.120
(1.86)* (6.50)***
Observations 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544
R-squared 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
Linked Relatives
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Total Asset (Ln) 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
-1.310 -1.140 -1.540 -1.510 -1.620 -1.220 -1.180 -1.260
ROA -2.246 -2.438 -1.903 -1.816 1.258 1.196 1.183 1.234
(2.35)** (2.54)** (1.98)** (1.91)* (2.22)** (2.12)** (2.07)** (2.17)**
Employees (Ln) 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
-0.130 -0.180 -0.130 -0.040 -1.150 -1.500 -1.510 -1.500
Volatility 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
(2.53)** (2.57)** (2.60)*** (2.66)*** -0.390 -0.790 -0.790 -0.800
Firm Age (Ln) -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
-0.370 -0.240 -0.600 -0.070 (1.84)* (2.51)** (2.60)*** (2.70)***
Founding-Family Ownership 0.043 0.195
(1.68)* (10.15)***
Invest. Manager Ownership -0.026 -0.008
(3.20)*** (1.90)*
Hedge Fund Ownership 0.090 -0.019
(3.90)*** -1.580
Other Inst. Ownership 0.136 -0.007
(8.07)*** -1.020
Observations 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
correlation between the institutional investor number and the board size in
Figure 2.13.
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TABLE 2.10: Impact of Institutional Ownership Over Board Size. I study the impact of institutional ownership on board size using a two-way
fixed effect model. There are 30,690 firm-year observations in my sample. I merge it with the RiskMetrics database and identify the board size
for 24,899 of them. Firm age (ln) = ln(1+firm age). I consider a two-way fixed effect model, namely industry and time fixed effect in specification
(1), (3), (5), and (7), and firm and time fixed effect in specification (2), (4), (6), and (8), to perform the analysis.
Board Size (Ln)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Assets (Ln) 0.061 0.038 0.060 0.038 0.061 0.038 0.062 0.038
(30.27)*** (8.40)*** (30.11)*** (8.37)*** (30.43)*** (8.45)*** (30.79)*** (8.50)***
ROA -0.121 -0.032 -0.123 -0.033 -0.110 -0.030 -0.100 -0.030
(6.71)*** (2.30)** (6.90)*** (2.40)** (6.15)*** (2.17)** (5.66)*** (2.15)**
Employee (Ln) 0.022 0.032 0.022 0.032 0.023 0.032 0.023 0.032
(10.96)*** (6.67)*** (10.84)*** (6.67)*** (11.17)*** (6.69)*** (11.26)*** (6.70)***
Volatility -0.191 -0.079 -0.190 -0.079 -0.190 -0.079 -0.188 -0.078
(19.56)*** (10.22)*** (19.53)*** (10.22)*** (19.46)*** (10.21)*** (19.28)*** (10.20)***
Firm Age (Ln) 0.037 0.055 0.037 0.056 0.038 0.054 0.038 0.055
(17.39)*** (9.16)*** (17.34)*** (9.28)*** (17.71)*** (9.13)*** (17.91)*** (9.24)***
Institutional Ownership -0.071 -0.006
(6.32)*** -0.660
Invest. Manager Ownership -0.155 -0.030
(11.65)*** (2.62)***
Hedge Fund Ownership -0.077 0.020
(2.33)** -0.670
Other Inst. Ownership 0.114 0.040
(5.37)*** (2.31)**
Observations 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544 22544
R-squared 0.47 0.84 0.47 0.84 0.47 0.84 0.47 0.84
Industry Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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The concentration of ownership towards institutional investors also changes
the board composition in another dimension—it changes the boards’ external
network connections. The boards are increasingly connected externally with
institutional investors. In 1994, the percentage of firms whose boards were
linked to an investment manager was 20.69 percent, venture capital 10.69 per-
cent, private equity 0.46 percent and hedge fund 0 percent, respectively. In 2012,
these numbers were 52.28 percent, 26.14 percent, 45.03 percent and 3.23 percent,
respectively. As noted in Figure 2.14, there has been an upward trend in the
board’s external network connection with investment manager, private equity,
and venture capital. The connection with private equity has experienced a 45
percent increase, which is the sharpest among all types of institutional investors.
Although private equity does not seem to play an important role in the owner-
ship structure, they have had a substantial impact on boards’ external network
connections. On the other hand, the connection with hedge funds only experi-
enced a 3.23 percent increase, which is the lowest amongst all the institutional
investors. Hedge funds tend to be powerful in the ownership structure, but their
impact on the boards’ external network connections is limited.
2.6 Robustness Check
In this section, I consider blockholder ownership as the dependent variable and
explain it using firm’s accounting performance measure (ROA) as a robustness
check. I use a two-way fixed effect model as Table 2.6. As Table 2.11 shows, my
results are robust under the alternative performance measure. In specification
(1) and (2) in Panel A of Table 2.11, the negative coefficient of the ROA suggests
that the institutional investor tends to target firms with lower ROA. By contrast,
I document a positive and significant coefficient of ROA for founding-family
ownership in specification (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table 2.11, suggesting that
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they tend to increase (decrease) their positions when ROA is high (low). In
order to relieve the concern that the causal direction is the opposite, that is,
institutional ownership damages firm accounting performance, while family
ownership improves firm accounting performance, I include ROA lagged one
year as an explanatory variable in Panel B. As the Table shows, the coefficient of
lagged ROA is negative and significant in specification (1) and (2), and positive
and significant in specification (3) and (4). The opposite causal direction is less
likely to be true.
2.7 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, I draw a detailed picture of the ownership structure of major U.S.
public companies during the period 1994 to 2012. I find that a concentration of
ownership towards financial institutions and private investors started to form as
early as 1980 until after 2010. Widely held public companies are about to become
extinct.10 Means (1967) shows that the ultimate ownership of big corporations
has become even more widely dispersed during the time period from 1929 to
1963, while my paper shows that this trend of dispersion is reversed around the
1980s. In my future research, I will explain the reason behind this reversal.
In a market that is characterized by widely held public companies, investors
get liquidity at the expense of high agency costs as there is no disciplinary
large shareholder. On the other hand, a market is characterized by one single
block of shareholders that commands a majority of the shares is criticized for
sacrificing investor liquidity (Tirole 2005). The concentration may also reduce the
benefits of market monitoring by reducing stock liquidity (Holmstrom and Tirole
10The picture of the ownership structure before 1994 is still incomplete since electronic proxy
filings were not available in the SEC EDGAR database until 1994. By merging the ownership
data in Shleifer and Vishny (1986), we now understand roughly how ownership evolved in
the 1980s. Nevertheless, it is necessary to collect the ownership data in order to fill the gap in
knowledge.
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TABLE 2.11: Robustness Check: Evolution of Ownership Structure (Fixed Effect Model). Institu-
tional Investor is defined as an institution or an individual with an investment purpose or providing
financial services by holding at least 5 percent of the firm. In my definition, it includes investment
managers/advisors (invest. manager), hedge funds, private equity firms (PE), commercial banks,
financial services, private investors, insurance, mutual/pension funds, and other investment entities.
Post Crisis Dummy is a dummy variable and equals 1 when the proxy filing date is later than Jan 1,
2009. Total asset (AT) and return on assets (ROA) are taken from or calculated by using the data in the
Compustat FUNDA database. Volatility is defined as the annualized standard deviation of the stock
returns in the period between two proxy filing dates. I consider a two-way fixed effect model, namely
industry and time fixed effect in specification (1), (3), (5), and (7), and firm and time fixed effect in
specification (2), (4), (6), and (8), to perform the analysis.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Ownership (in Percentage)
Institutional Investor Founding-Family Employee Ownership Corporation Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Assets (Ln) -1.752 -2.737 -0.651 -0.621 0.078 0 0.028 -0.305
(28.97)*** (14.62)*** (16.89)*** (9.25)*** (7.57)*** -0.01 -1.14 (4.48)***
ROA -14.977 -13.525 6.939 0.422 -0.025 -0.05 -3.348 -1.33
(14.14)*** (13.37)*** (11.65)*** -1.41 -0.22 -0.6 (7.38)*** (3.31)***
Volatility 0.335 -0.531 0.41 0.703 -0.472 -0.206 1.358 1.155
-0.59 -1 -1.34 (4.72)*** (5.92)*** (3.49)*** (5.63)*** (6.04)***
Post Crisis Dummy 1.739 -0.551 -0.066 -0.252
(4.00)*** (3.93)*** -1.22 (1.90)*
Observations 30298 30298 30298 30298 30298 30298 30298 30298
R-squared 0.2 0.61 0.08 0.91 0.04 0.75 0.04 0.66
Industry Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Ownership (in Percentage)
Institutional Investor Founding-Family Employee Ownership Corporation Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Assets (Ln) -1.868 -2.901 -0.634 -0.5 0.082 0.002 0.033 -0.196
(29.57)*** (13.76)*** (15.79)*** (7.17)*** (7.59)*** -0.07 -1.35 (2.71)***
ROA (-1) -11.23 -7.694 6.751 0.738 -0.015 0.016 -3.453 -1.308
(9.89)*** (7.28)*** (11.15)*** (2.71)*** -0.13 -0.16 (7.74)*** (3.55)***
Volatility 1.93 0.805 -0.122 0.561 -0.429 -0.203 1.132 1.004
(3.29)*** -1.43 -0.42 (4.06)*** (5.37)*** (3.21)*** (5.04)*** (5.65)***
Post Crisis Dummy 1.756 -0.53 -0.065 -0.232
(3.98)*** (3.92)*** -1.17 (1.73)*
Observations 27198 27198 27198 27198 27198 27198 27198 27198
R-squared 0.2 0.63 0.08 0.92 0.04 0.76 0.04 0.69
Industry Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
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1993). The ownership structure of major U.S. public companies exhibits some
unique characteristics that help striking a balance between liquidity and control.
Institutional investors were thought to be remarkably powerless (e.g., Jensen
1989; Chaganti and Damanour 1991; Coffee 1991). Chaganti and Damanour
(1991) argue that “It has generally been assumed that institutional owners—
unlike individual or family owners—do not exercise their power to challenge
the management or, if they do, their chances for success are small”. Coffee (1991)
argues that “if the public at large has a concern about financial institutions today,
it is not their strength, but their weakness, that worries them.” This was true in
the 1980s, when institutional investors held fewer shares and family ownership
was still very powerful. However, the sharp trend in the concentration of
ownership among institutional investors in the last two decades suggests that
the strength of financial institutions, rather than their weakness, maybe more of
a concern for the general public today and in the future.
The literature may need a new theoretical model which allows the partici-
pation of multiple blockholders. Empirically, the evolution of the ownership
structure of non-American firms still requires further investigation. Based on
a sample of firms in the DAX 100 index, Dittmann et al. (2010) find that the
banks’ equity ownership declined sharply from 1994 to 2005 and that the Ger-
man financial system lost some of its formerly distinctive features. It seems that
the German companies have followed a different evolutionary course than the
American firms—that is, ownership is dispersed from financial institutions such
as banks to investors whose identities remain anonymous.
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Nepotism and Equity Prices
3.1 Introduction
Nepotism is a special form of social networks, and its prevalence within firms
and economic implication has not been systematically studied yet. To fill this
gap, I identify family ties among corporate insiders within major U.S. public
firms by searching more than 30 keywords indicating the potential presence
of nepotism in the proxy filings using the Perl programing language. I follow
Wasserman and Faust (1994) and measure the strength of nepotism by degree
and density. I find that nepotism is very prevalent in the S&P 1500 firms, of
which 53.46 percent exhibit nepotism. My contribution to the existing literature
is the development of a nepotism database covering family ties within major
U.S. public companies from 1994 to 2012, and a nepotism index indicating the
strength of nepotism. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of the
internal structure of modern corporations.
I find that firms with nepotism underperform significantly. The abnormal
return is 31 basis points (bps) per month, or 3.8 percent per year, over the
estimating period. This point estimate is significant at the 5 percent level; 72
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percent of the firms having founding-family ownership exhibit nepotism, which
is more than 20 percent higher than firms without founding-family ownership.
For firms having founding-family ownership, nepotism is associated with worse
firm performance.
My paper differs from the family firm literature (e.g., Anderson and Reeb
2003; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Miller et al. 2007; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Lins
et al. 2013) in two aspects: First, a firm with nepotism is not necessarily a
family firm. Second, I measure the strength of the nepotism quantitatively. My
nepotism measure can be used to study nepotism within family firms. My paper
is consistent with Perez-Gonzalez (2006), in which they find that nepotism hurts
firm performance. In my paper, I find that nepotism in firms with founding-
family ownership is associated with worse firm performance. This is consistent
with the findings in Miller et al. (2007), in which they find only businesses
with a lone founder outperform. My paper also contributes to the fast growing
literature investigating the role of social network in corporate finance, e.g.,
executive compensation (Engelberg et al. 2013; Hwang and Kim 2009; Shue
2013), financial policy (Fracassi 2008), firm policies (Shue 2013), governance
(Fracassi and Tate 2012), access to capital (Hochberg et al. 2007; Engelberg et
al. 2010), incidence of fraud (Chidambaran et al. 2010), acquisition activity (Cai
and Sevilir 2009; Ishii and Xuan 2009; Schmidt 2009), and analysts’ ability of
gathering superior information (Cohen et al. 2010).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I identify nepo-
tism and construct nepotism measures. In Section 3.3, I report the empirical
results and analysis. In Section 3.4, I show the robustness of my findings. In
Section 4.4, I offer a conclusion. In Appendix A, I describe the technical details
of the Perl programming language and the SEC EDGAR database.
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3.2 Sample Construction
3.2.1 Nepotism Measure
I follow the social network literature and define nepotism degree and density to
measure the strength of nepotism. I define two measures which are used widely
in the standard social network literature in order to measure the strength of
nepotism. The degree of a corporate insider is the number of family connections
he or she possesses, while the nepotism degree is the average degree of all cor-
porate insiders within firms, and nepotism density is the ratio of the number of
family connections present to the maximum possible. Specifically, the definition
of the nepotism measures can be found in the following equations:
D(ni) = Degree of actor ni, i.e., number of relations incident with actor ni
L = Number of lines in the network, 2L =
∑N
i=1D(ni)
N = Number of actors in the network
Nepotism Degree =
∑N
i=1D(ni)
N
=
2L
N
Nepotism Density =
∑N
i=1D(ni)
N(N − 1) =
2L
N(N − 1)
Nepotism Dummy =
 1 if Nepotism Degree>00 Otherwise
3.2.2 Nepotism Identification
Nepotism is a special form of social network: First, family ties are exogenous
in the sense that they are less likely to be formed by working together in the
firm like other relationships. Second, a family relation must be disclosed in the
proxy statement. The concern of self-selection bias is relieved. I consider family
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relationships among all corporate insiders, defined as a company’s officers,
directors and beneficial owners holding more than 5 percent a class of the
company’s equity securities. I only consider family ties among immediate family
members, defined in the item 404 in Regulation S-K. I consider proxy filings
filed by major U.S. public firms with the SEC EDGAR database as the main data
source for nepotism.
The SEC requires that shareholders of a company whose securities are reg-
istered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 receive a proxy
statement prior to a shareholder meeting, and the proxy statement must disclose
the family relationships among directors, nominee for election as directors, offi-
cers of the company, the person chosen to be an officer of the company, where
the family relationship means any relationship by blood, marriage, or adoption,
nor more remote than first cousin. The companies are also required to disclose
the value of the securities owned by each director or nominee and his or her
immediate family member on an aggregate basis. Moreover, the companies are
also under an obligation to disclose the relationships if a director, nominee, or
an immediate family member has a direct or indirect interest, the value of which
exceeds $120,000, in a company if he or she is a party to a contract, arrangement,
or understanding with respect to any securities of, or interest in, the company.
The data are available since 1996, as companies were phased in to EDGAR filings
over a three-year period, ending May 6, 1996. As of that date, all public domestic
companies were required to make their filings on EDGAR.
I consider firms in the Execucomp database which mainly includes S&P
1500 firms and remove utility firms (SIC codes between 4910 and 4940). As a
robustness check, I also examine all firms in the SEC EDGAR database, which
includes all the U.S. public firms. I download all proxy filings from the SEC
EDGAR database, and then use a Perl program to search the proxy filings for
keywords indicating family relationships. For instance, a disclosure of family
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relationship among corporate insiders in proxy statement can be like “A and
B are first brothers”, and I identify the relationship by matching the keyword
“brothers” using a regular expression in the Perl program. My identification
strategy captures all the family relationships among corporate insiders disclosed
in the proxy filings.
For the firms in the Execucomp database, I manually clean the nepotism
identified by the Perl program. I remove firms with dual-class common stock
from my sample because the governance structure is completely different from
the single-class. There are 23,244 firm-year observations left. I decompose the
identified nepotism by verifying manually whether the keyword indicates a
family tie between directors and executives, or between directors and large
shareholders, etc. I take the number of the identified keywords as a proxy of
the number of the family tie in the nepotism (L). I report the cleaned keywords
frequencies in Table 3.1.
I use the CRSP header file with the date of beginning stock data to calculate
the firm age. I consider the difference between the proxy filing date and the
date of beginning stock data, which will give me the number of days each stock
was included in the CRSP database, as a proxy of the firm age. I consider the
years of accounting data available in Compustat as an alternative proxy for firm
age when date of beginning stock data is not available in the CRSP database.
I take Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) as the data source to
identify the number of corporate insiders (N ). Corporate insiders are defined
as a company’s officers and directors, and any beneficial owners of a class of
the company’s equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Corporate insiders must file with the SEC a statement of
ownership regarding those securities. The initial filing is on Form 3.1 Changes
1An insider of an issuer that is registering equity securities for the first time under Section
12 of the Exchange Act must file this form no later than the effective date of the registration
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TABLE 3.1: Family Tie Distribution. Tabulation of family tie distribution. I
identify family ties among corporate insiders in the proxy filings by searching
keywords using Perl program. The Perl program capture all disclosed family
ties for firms in the Execucomp database. Utilities firms (SIC code between 4900
and 4940) are removed from the sample. There are 68,775 family ties in total.
The validity of the keyword is manually checked.
Keywords Frequency
Wife 10986
Son 8840
Brother 6348
Daughter 4815
Son-In-Law 2075
Father 1998
Brother-In-Law 1993
Husband 1973
Father-In-Law 1404
Sister 1370
Sister-In-Law 1254
Cousin 1187
Nephew 1177
Sibling 1174
Daughter-In-Law 1158
Mother-In-Law 1037
Mother 1030
Niece 733
Uncle 321
Grandfather 157
Grandson 145
Stepson 73
Stepdaughter 44
Step-Daughter 23
Ex-Wife 20
Stepfather 15
Step-Mother 11
Stepmother 11
Step-Father 7
Stepbrother 5
Step-Son-In-Law 4
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TABLE 3.2: Nepotism and Founding-family Ownership. As described in Section 3.2.3, I consider
the proxy statement the Internet, which includes but is not restricted to Wikipedia, Bloomberg
Businessweek, FundingUniverse, and local newspapers, as my main data source to identify the founder
for each firm in my sample. Positive Ownership Dummy equals one if the founding-family holds positive
outstanding shares. Otherwise, it equals zero. I also report the founding-family Ownership conditional
on that there is positive founding-family ownership. Nepotism Dummy (conditional) indicates presence
of nepotism when founding-family ownership is present in the firm. For each firm with founding-
family ownership, I also manually verify if the CEO is from the founding family. A CEO is considered
as a first generation CEO if he or she is the founder of the firm, while a CEO is considered as a second
generation if the CEO position is held by the founder’s descendant or relative.
Year N Nepotism Dummy Founding Family Family CEO
Dummy Ownership Nepotism Dummy Dummy 1st Generation 2nd Generation
(Conditional) Dummy Dummy
1996 303 57% 41.58% 4.76% 67.74% 28.05% 23.10% 4.95%
1997 1,239 59% 31.88% 3.85% 74.10% 20.34% 16.87% 3.47%
1998 1,296 58% 32.56% 3.87% 73.08% 20.22% 16.36% 3.86%
1999 1,370 57% 33.21% 3.99% 71.27% 20.15% 16.13% 4.01%
2000 1,388 56% 33.57% 3.90% 68.91% 20.97% 17.00% 3.96%
2001 1,388 57% 31.12% 3.45% 69.58% 19.38% 15.99% 3.39%
2002 1,351 54% 29.98% 3.20% 70.25% 17.62% 13.99% 3.63%
2003 1,358 57% 29.68% 3.01% 72.80% 16.72% 12.81% 3.90%
2004 1,381 59% 28.39% 2.89% 74.68% 16.58% 12.96% 3.62%
2005 1,456 61% 26.92% 2.70% 73.77% 15.11% 11.33% 3.78%
2006 1,405 61% 25.34% 2.53% 75.36% 14.59% 10.82% 3.77%
2007 1,498 63% 26.23% 2.63% 75.26% 14.75% 11.08% 3.67%
2008 1,682 60% 26.28% 2.82% 72.41% 15.16% 11.41% 3.69%
2009 1,636 59% 25.31% 2.76% 72.10% 14.12% 10.70% 3.42%
2010 1,613 56% 24.43% 2.54% 72.80% 13.70% 10.17% 3.53%
2011 1,549 55% 24.08% 2.43% 73.20% 13.17% 9.68% 3.42%
2012 1,331 54% 22.46% 2.32% 73.08% 12.02% 8.41% 3.53%
Overall 23,244 58% 29.00% 3.16% 72.38% 17.21% 13.46% 3.74%
in ownership are reported on Form 4. Insiders must file a Form 5 to report any
transactions that should have been reported earlier on a Form 4 or were eligible
for deferred reporting. The IFDF is designed to capture all U.S. insider activity
as reported on Form 3, 4, 5. Each year, I take the number of insiders disclosed in
all previous filings, but still staying at the firm as the number of the actors in the
nepotism (N ). The concern of this identification strategy is that the number of
insiders may be related to the firm’s future performance in the long-run. In the
robustness check section, I will show the difference in realized returns cannot be
attributed to the difference in the number of insiders.
statement. If the issuer is already registered under Section 12, the insider must file a Form 3
within ten days of becoming an officer, director, or beneficial owner.
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FIGURE 3.1: Plot of Nepotism Measure Over Firm Age. Plot of nepotism measure,
i.e., nepotism degree and density, over firm age. The distribution of firm age is also
reported.
3.2.3 Founding-family Ownership Identification
In order to identify the founding-family ownership, I first identify the founder
of the firm. I consider proxy filings and the Internet as my data source to identify
a founder’s name. I first check whether the founder’s name is disclosed in the
proxy statement by searching the keyword “founder” in the proxy statement. I
then manually verify and collect the disclosed information on a founder or his
or her family members in the proxy filings by searching the keywords indicating
a family tie. I turn to the public data source on the Internet by searching and
reading carefully the firm history when founder information is not available
in the proxy statement. My data source includes among others Wikipedia,
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Bloomberg Businessweek, FundingUniverse, and local newspapers. I identify
the ownership of a founder and his or her family members in the beneficial
ownership table by matching the full names.
Founding-family is naturally associated with nepotism. As Table 3.2 shows,
72.36 percent of the firms with founding-family ownership exhibit nepotism
within the corporations, which is 20 percent higher than that without founding-
family ownership. For each firm with founding-family ownership, I also man-
ually verify if the CEO is from the founding family. A CEO is considered as a
first generation CEO if he or she is the founder of the firm. A CEO from the
founding-family but not the founder will be classified as the second generation
CEO.
3.3 Empirical Methodology and Results
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
I report the descriptive statistics of nepotism, family ownership, and blockholder
presence, and etc., for my sample in Table 3.2. As the table shows, 29 percent
of the firms in my sample have founding-family ownership. On average, the
founding-family owns 11 percent of firm’s outstanding shares; 17 percent of the
firms have a CEO from the founding family, while 13.46 percent of them are
considered as the first generation CEO and 3.74 percent of them are considered
as the second generation CEO. In my identification, nepotism dummy equals
one when a firm exhibits nepotism; Otherwise, it is zero. I calculate nepotism
degree and density for each firm-year observation in my sample. As Table 3.3
shows, the nepotism dummy is stable over time. The strength of nepotism is also
associated with firm age. As Figure 3.1 shows, the nepotism strength exhibits a
downward trend over firm age.
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TABLE 3.3: Nepotism Over Years. I report the descriptive statistics of nepotism measure
over time. Nepotism dummy, degree and density is defined in Section 3.2.1.
Calendar Year N Nepotism Dummy Nepotism Degree Nepotism Density
1996 296 56.42% 16.11% 0.87%
1997 1204 57.56% 15.04% 0.78%
1998 1253 56.66% 13.88% 0.74%
1999 1332 55.48% 14.25% 0.76%
2000 1351 54.63% 13.98% 0.79%
2001 1359 55.70% 14.52% 0.77%
2002 1326 52.87% 12.69% 0.65%
2003 1330 56.39% 13.64% 0.62%
2004 1352 57.77% 15.18% 0.81%
2005 1433 60.01% 15.55% 0.70%
2006 1376 60.39% 14.82% 0.68%
2007 1473 62.32% 15.82% 0.81%
2008 1654 59.61% 15.61% 0.71%
2009 1614 58.24% 15.27% 0.87%
2010 1598 55.82% 13.46% 0.66%
2011 1536 54.56% 13.42% 0.66%
2012 1326 54.07% 12.47% 0.56%
Overall 23244 57.06% 14.40% 0.73%
3.3.2 Nepotism Measure and Returns: A Fama-French Perspec-
tive
I follow Gompers et al. (2003) and test whether there is a relationship between
nepotism and firm returns. If nepotism matters for firm performance and this
relationship is not completely incorporated by the market, then the realized
returns on the stock would differ systematically among portfolios. The disparity
in returns could be attributed to the different exposure to the market factor, the
firm’s market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and immediate past returns,
which have all been shown as important determinants of future returns signifi-
cantly. There are several methods in the literature developed to account for the
difference in returns. I extend Carhart (1997) four-factor model with the addition
of factor YMOt to capture the effect of firm age, as Figure 3.1 clearly shows that
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the nepotism is negatively related to firm age.
RNepotismDummy=1it −RNepotismDummy=0it (3.1)
= αi + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4Momentumt + β5YMOt + t
Where RNetwork=1it − RNetwork=0it is the return from going long on a portfolio of
firms that with nepotism and short on a portfolio of firms without nepotism.
RMRFt is the market excess return in month t. SMBt, HMLt and Momentumt
are the month t returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed
to capture size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively. I use six
value-weight portfolios formed on size and firm age to construct YMOt. The
portfolios, which are formed monthly, are the intersections of the two portfolios
formed on size (market equity) and three portfolios formed on firm age. The
monthly size breakpoint is the median NYSE market equity. The annual firm
age breakpoints are the 30th and 70th percentiles. YMOt is the average return
on the two young portfolios minus the average return on the two old portfolios.
The estimated intercept, i.e., alpha, is interpreted as an abnormal return in
excess of what could have been achieved by passive investment in the five
factors. A positive and significant alpha will lend support to the conjecture
that nepotism within a firm is associated with a more effective organizational
structure and better corporate governance. A negative and significant alpha
will support the conjecture that the nepotism is associated with worse firm
performance. The first row and the second row of Table 3.4 Panel A show that
results of estimating alpha for portfolios with and without nepotism (P0 and
P1), respectively. The dependent variable is the monthly return. The third row
shows the result of estimating Equation 3.1 where the dependent variable is the
monthly return difference between the portfolio with and without nepotism.
The sample period is taken from June 1, 1996, since when all public domestic
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TABLE 3.4: Five-factor Performance-Attribution Regressions for Portfolios on Nepo-
tism.The sample period is taken from June 1996 through December 2012. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent
levels are indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively.
α RMRF SMB HML Momentum YMO Adj. R2
Nepotism Dummy=0 0.41*** 1.05*** -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.91
(P0) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Nepotism Dummy=1 0.14** 1.01*** -0.11*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.96
(P1) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
P1-P0 -0.31** -0.05 -0.08** -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.01
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06)
companies were required to make their filings on EDGAR, through December
31, 2012. The abnormal return is 31 basis points (bps) per month, or 3.8 percent
per year, over the estimating period. This point estimate is significant at the 5
percent level. The result suggests that firms with nepotism underperforms on
average. The argument that nepotism represents a more efficient organizational
structure is not supported by my results.
3.3.3 Nepotism in Firms having Founding-family Ownership
In the literature, Anderson and Reeb (2003) document that founding-family
ownership is very prevalent and firms with founding-family ownership are
associated with good firm performance. I consider the portfolio that includes
firms having no founding-family ownership as the benchmark. As Table 3.5
shows, firms with founding-family ownership perform better only when there is
no nepotism. The performance of the benchmark portfolio is 77 basis points, or
9.6 percent per year below the portfolio without nepotism (P0). The difference
in the performance is significant at the 1 percent level. However, for firms
having both founding-family ownership and nepotism, the difference in alpha
is only 13 basis points, which is statistically insignificant. My paper extends
the existing family literature by showing that firms having founding-family
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TABLE 3.5: The Nepotism in the Firms with Founding-Family Ownership This ta-
ble presents the results of five-factor performance-attribution regressions for portfolios
on founding-family ownership. I consider the portfolio that includes firms having no
founding-family ownership as the benchmark portfolio. The portfolios are updated at the
beginning of each year. The sample period is taken from June 1996 through December
2012. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively.
α RMRF SMB HML Momentum YMO Adj. R2
Nepotism Dummy=0 0.91*** 1.15*** -0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.48*** 0.80
(P0) (0.24) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (0.13)
Nepotism Dummy=1 0.30* 0.98*** -0.12* -0.09 -0.03 0.34*** 0.83
(P1) (0.18) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
Benchmark - P0 -0.77*** -0.13* -0.01 0.13 -0.06* -0.70*** 0.53
(0.24) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.04) (0.15)
Benchmark - P1 -0.13 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.02 -0.53*** 0.45
(0.2) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12)
ownership outperform only when there is no nepotism in the firm. My results
are consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006) in which they find that family
ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm
or as Chairman with a hired CEO. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value
is destroyed. My results are also consistent with Miller et al. (2007), in which
they find only businesses with a lone founder outperform.
3.4 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, I repeat my regression over all the firms in the SEC
EDGAR database, which in total covers 13,717 firms and includes 109,404 obser-
vations from year 1996 to 2012. Moreover, as I mentioned in Section 3.2.2, one
concern of the identification strategy is that the identified number of insiders
(N ) may be related to the firm’s future performance in the long-run, i.e., it is the
number of insider (N ) in the denominator of nepotism measure that generates
the difference in the realized returns. To relieve this concern, I extend models
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in Section 3.3.2 with the addition of factor NMML to capture the effect of the
number of insiders:
RNepotismDummy=1it −RNepotismDummy=0it
= αi + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4Momentumt + β5YMOt + β6NMMLt + t
I use six value-weight portfolios formed on size and number of insiders (N ) to
construct NMMLt. The portfolios, which are formed monthly, are the intersec-
tions of 2 portfolios formed on size (market equity) and 3 portfolios formed on
number of insiders. The monthly size breakpoint is the median NYSE market eq-
uity. The annual number of insiders breakpoints is the 30th and 70th percentiles.
NMMLt is the average return on the two portfolios with more insiders minus
the average return on the two portfolios with fewer insiders. I show the results
in Table 3.6.
The difference in realized returns cannot be attributed to the difference in
the number of insiders. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows that for the firm in the SEC
EDGAR database, the performance of a portfolio of firms with the nepotism is 21
basis points (bps) per month, or 2.5 percent per year below the one of a portfolio
of firms without the nepotism. The difference is significant at the 5 percent level.
Panel B of Table 3.6 shows that, for the firms in the Execucomp database, the
performance of a portfolio of firms with the nepotism is 38 basis points (bps) per
month, or 4.7 percent per year below the one of a portfolio of firms without the
nepotism. For the firms with founding-family ownership, the performance of a
portfolio of firms with the nepotism is 78 basis points (bps) per month, or 9.8
percent per year below the one of a portfolio of firms without the nepotism.
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TABLE 3.6: Robustness Check: Six-factor Performance-Attribution Regressions for Portfolios on
Nepotism. The sample period is taken from June 1996 through December 2012. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels are indicated
by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Firms in the SEC EDGAR Database
α RMRF SMB HML Momentum YMO NMML Adjusted R2
Nepotism Dummy=0 0.32*** 1.03*** 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.10** 0.97
(P0) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Nepotism Dummy=1 0.11** 1.00*** -0.03* 0.03 -0.01** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.97
(P1) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
P1-P0 -0.21** -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.12** 0.21*** 0.05
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
Panel B: Firms in the Execucomp Database
α RMRF SMB HML Momentum YMO NMML Adjusted R2
Nepotism Dummy=0 0.42*** 1.05*** -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.10* -0.08 0.91
(P0) (0.11) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07)
Nepotism Dummy=1 0.08 1.00*** -0.10*** 0.01 -0.01 0.14*** 0.26*** 0.96
(P1) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
P1-P0 -0.38*** -0.05* -0.06* -0.03 -0.02 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.06
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.08)
Panel C: Firms in the Execucomp Database (with Founding-Family Ownership)
α RMRF SMB HML Momentum YMO NMML Adjusted R2
Nepotism Dummy=0 0.91*** 1.16*** -0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.47*** -0.03 0.80
(P0) (0.24) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (0.15) (0.16)
Nepotism Dummy=1 0.19 0.97*** -0.09 -0.11 -0.04 0.62*** 0.55*** 0.84
(P1) (0.19) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.12) (0.14)
P1-P0 -0.78*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.09* 0.14 0.60*** 0.13
(0.28) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.05) (0.17) (0.19)
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3.5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, I study nepotism within firms in a social network perspective.
For the first time in the literature, I show that nepotism is very prevalent in the
U.S. public firms, of which 53.46 percent exhibit nepotism. I construct nepotism
degree and density to measure the strength of nepotism. I find that nepotism is
associated with worse firm performance, especially for firms having founding-
family ownership. My contribution to the existing literature is the development
of a nepotism database covering family ties within major U.S. public companies
from 1994 to 2012 and a nepotism index indicating the strength of nepotism. My
paper also extends the existing family literature by showing that firms having
founding-family ownership outperform only when there is no nepotism in the
firm.
My results can be extended in several directions. In my future research, I
will go one step further further and study how the nepotism influences firm
performance. Specifically, it will be interesting to study: 1) If firms with female-
dominant nepotism perform better than male-dominant one. 2) Blockholder
activism could monitor nepotism by intervention and how outside blockholder
interacts with internal nepotism.
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Unexpected CEO Option Exercises
4.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, stock option compensation has been one of the major
compensation tools which is used to align the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
interests with shareholders value. A great fraction of public firms regularly
grant new at-the-money options with ten years to maturity to their CEOs over
the CEOs’ tenure. After a CEO has held her position for a few years, she will
hold an option portfolio that exhibits great variation in the option exercise price,
years to maturity, time value, etc. In this paper, we argue that executive stock
option exercises (ESO) provide us with a natural instrument to examine how
a CEO’s private knowledge on the firm’s future performance, influences her
current choice in option exercise.
The literature on CEO equity compensation has examined the timing of the
CEOs option awards (Yermack 1997; Chauvin and Shenoy 2001; Lie 2005; Heron
and Lie 2007), however, there is little empirical research conducted on executive
option exercise patterns (Carpenter 1998) and on how the executives’ choices are
related to the characteristics of other options in the choice set. There are some
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theory papers on the optimal option exercise policy. For example, Huddart (1994)
considers the optimal dynamic exercise strategy of an employee who receives a
stock option. Carpenter (1998) introduces a simpler model which can describe
actual option exercises just as well as a complex preference-based model. These
models, however, leave out the possibilities that the option holders may also
exercise options based on private information on the future path of the stock
price. In the empirical literature, Huddart and Lang (1996) describe the exercise
behavior of over 50,000 employees who hold long-term options on employer
stock at eight corporations and they find exercise decision is strongly associated
with recent stock price movements, the market-to-strike ratio, proximity to
vesting dates, time to maturity, etc. Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) investigate
stock option exercise decision by 50,000 employees at seven corporations, and
find that psychological factors influence exercise. A recent study relevant to the
CEO option exercises is Klein and Maug (2011), who analyze how 14,000 US top
executives exercise their stock options. They find that exercise decisions depend
on past stock prices in a way that is consistent with reference dependence,
whereas they find inconsistent evidence for trend extrapolation. However, there
is little research on the CEO choice problem about selecting which option to
exercise.
In this paper, we rely on a novel approach to distinguish “expected” option
exercises, which are more likely to be motivated by factors irrelevant to insider
information, from the “unexpected” option exercises, which are more likely to
carry insider information. Our analysis builds on the simple idea that expected
option exercises are commonplace in the market, and are more associated with
time to maturity, time value, diversification or liquidity constraints and etc., and
therefore signal no information on the firm to the market. We first evaluate each
individual option exercise and classify whether the exercise is an “expected”
exercise. We then document to what extent the CEOs make the expected choice.
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Exploiting the fact that there is no use of inside information to time option
exercises generally (Carpenter and Remmers 2001), we use expected option
exercises as a benchmark and take a step further and mainly investigate whether
the deviation from the expected exercises carries insider information.
One can easily identify ex ante these expected and unexpected option ex-
ercises by examining the CEO option exercises and accordingly their option
portfolios. To better understand our approach, consider the following two exam-
ples from our sample.1 Mr. Chen, who became the CEO of the System Inc. since
1998, decided to exercise an option in March, 2008, and there are four options in
his choice set with expiration date equals 01JUL2012, 31JAN2013, 14FEB2013,
and 04FEB2014, respectively. He chose to exercise the first option, with more
than 4 years to expiration, and sacrifice $9.9 time value. It is an “expected”
option exercise in our identification as the exercised option has the shortest time
to maturity and possesses the lowest time value. While theoretically it maybe be
too early to exercise the option, the exercise can be justified by other factors, e.g.,
he needs money to buy a real estate and faces a liquidity constraint. The reaction
in the market is insignificant, e.g., the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in
the interval (-1,1) is 0.4%. He decided to exercise an option again in Septem-
ber, 2008 and in his portfolio there are four options with the expiration date
equals 01JUL2012, 31JAN2013, 14FEB2013, and 04FEB2014, respectively. The
first option has the shortest time to maturity and possesses the lowest time value.
Mr. Steven deviates from the “expected” option exercise and chooses the fourth
one to exercise. We note that the fourth option has more than 5 years to expire
and the sacrificed time value is $11. There is a strong negative reaction in stock
returns when the market learns about the option exercise, e.g., the CAR in the
interval (-1, 1) is -2.9%. It is an “unexpected” option exercise in our identification
1The name of the firm, the name of the CEO, and the dates involved have been disguised.
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and we argue that this unusual exercising pattern carries information on the
firm’s future performance.
Our work is related but different with the literature in several aspects. The
main difference is that instead of examining all the option exercise (e.g., Heath,
Huddart and Lang 1999; Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Aboody, Hughes, Liu
and Su 2008; Klein and Maug 2011), we filter out any “expected” option exercises
which may be justified by many factors irrelevant to insider information, and
investigate whether the CEO’s deviation from the expected exercises carries
insider information. Our paper differs from Brooks, Chance and Cline (2012)
in many aspects. The most significant difference is that we study “unexpected”
option exercises. By differentiating unexpected from expected option exercises,
our paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the role of insider informa-
tion in the CEO option exercises. Our paper is related to the insider information
literature (e.g., Aboody and Lev 2000; Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Lakonishok
and Lee 2001; Ravina and Sapienza 2010; Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog 2006;
Adams, Wu and Zhu 2012; Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski 2012). We document
that 88% of the all the option exercises are strongly associated with the option
having the lowest time value or the shortest time to maturity. The remaining 12%
deviates from these expected exercises. We follow the literature and employ an
event study to examine the impact of insider information contained in the CEO’s
unexpected option exercise. We also estimate a general difference-in-difference
model and find that the unexpected option exercise carries more information on
the firm’s future than the expected one. Moreover, we find that the information
carried in the deviation is associated with the firm’s future performance both in
short-term and long-term.
Our work is related to Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) but differs both in
the research questions and methodology. Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012)
defines a routine trader as an insider who placed a trade in the same calendar
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month for at least a certain number of years in the past, and then define op-
portunistic traders as everyone else. Instead of using the previous trades, we
rely on the CEO’s choice in her option portfolio to classify a “routine” option
exercise. By examining the CEOs option portfolios, there is a natural advantage.
As previously mentioned, a great fraction of public firms regularly grant new
at-the-money options with ten years to maturity to their CEOs over the CEOs’
tenure. When the CEO tenure moves forward, an incumbent CEO will hold an
option portfolio that exhibits great variation in the option exercise price, years
to maturity and etc. This variation in the options’ characteristics, e.g., years to
maturity, time value and etc, provides us a natural instrument to examine how
the CEO’s private knowledge on the firm’s future performance, influence her
choice nowadays. Our paper differs from Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) in
two aspects. First, instead of explaining the pattern by the psychological belief
theory, we examine if the pattern carries insider information. Second, we find
that the CEO’s unexpected option exercises carries insider information, and
the results cannot be explained by the psychological belief theory. The exercise
decision may be determined in a psychological way, but considering the fact that
all the options in the portfolio are subject to the same stock price trends and it is
hard to explain why the CEO deviate from the routine exercises psychologically.
Our paper also contributes to the literature of timing CEO stock option awards
(Yermack 1997; Chauvin and Shenoy 2001; Lie 2005; Heron and Lie 2007). It is
noteworthy that Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007) find that the option awards
are timed retroactively. Such option backdating issue is not a concern in our
paper as our sample period is over 2006-2011.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the
sample construction process and provide descriptive statistics. In Section 4.3
2Since August 29, 2002 firms are required to report the option transaction to the SEC on Form
4 within two business days after the transaction, and the SEC publicly discloses this information
one day later on the SEC EDGAR database (Heron and Lie 2007).
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we describe the empirical methodology and report the empirical results. In
Section 4.4 we conclude and suggest avenues for future research.
4.2 Data and Sample Construction
4.2.1 Sample Selection
We rely on three main data sources to construct our sample: Thomson Reuters
Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF), Execucomp’s Outstanding Equity Awards
database (EOEA) and SEC EDGAR database for insider trading reports. We
consider all firms covered in the EOEA database from fiscal year 2006 to 2011,
and remove utility firms (SIC codes between 4910 and 4940). We exclude utility
firms as they are regulated, and CEOs have less managerial discretion.
We reply on both IFDF and EOEA to construct each CEO’s choice set when
she exercises the option. We make sure every individual option exercise does not
include reporting error by cross checking IFDF and EOEA. The IFDF is designed
to capture all the insider’s activities and does not report the option held by the
insider, while EOEA is designed to capture the CEO’s equity portfolio at the end
of the fiscal year and does not report any option exercises in the previous year.3
We use a novel identification procedure to filter out reporting errors, either in
EOEA or IFDF, in order to make sure every individual option exercise in the
sample does not include reporting errors by crossing check two databases. We
rely on the EOEA to identify which option are exercised and the aggregated
amount of the exercised option contracts in each year by comparing the proxy
3It is noteworthy we do not rely on the IFDF alone to construct the CEO’s option portfolio
as Klein and Maug (2011). Besides the data quality problem, the main concern is that the
constructed portfolios might be biased to the downside. For example, if an option grant to CEO
is somehow not included in the IFDF and this option has never been exercised, then we cannot
observe this option in the IFDF. By checking the databases and proxy filings in the SEC EDGAR
carefully, we find lots of options reported in the proxy statement, but we cannot track their initial
option grants transaction records in IFDF.
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statements in adjacent two years.. We require that the aggregate amount of
annually exercised option contracts we identify from the EOEA must equal to
the sum of individual exercised option we identify from the IFDF. This happens
only when all the individual option exercises are reported correctly in the year.
We consider the stock split in the year, and adjust the exercised option by the
adjustment factor for stock splits.
There are 398,423 observations in the EOEA over fiscal year 2006-2011. After
removing utility firms, restricted stock and observations with missing variables,
i.e., missing option exercise price, expiration date or the number of options.
We also remove interim and retiring CEOs. There are 51,397 observations for
2,425 CEOs in the sample. For each CEO-year observation, we compare her
outstanding equity with the one of the previous year and identify the change in
the outstanding equity. In this way, we identify 21,327 potential option exercises.
We remove 7,527 of them which are strongly associated with proximity to vesting
dates. We then remove 3,982 options which expire out of the money, i.e., the
maximum stock price over the fiscal year is below the option’s exercise price.
We then merge the sample with the IFDF by comparing the CEO’s full name.
A match is valid only when the first name, middle name and last name of the
executive reported in the EOEA match the full name of the executive in the
IFDF; 100 CEOs are lost during the merging process, which might be due to
the reporting errors or to the reporting irregularities in either IFDF or EOEA.
We require that the aggregate amount of annually exercised options we identify
from the EOEA must equal to the sum of individual exercised option we identify
from the IFDF. We successfully identify 2,376 exercised option contracts. We
also use the SEC EDGAR database as a complementary data source since we
notice that in some cases the IFDF fails to include option exercises existing in
the SEC EDGAR database.4 By merging with SEC EDGAR database, we add
4I elaborate more details in Appendix B.
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additional 936 observations to the original 2,376 exercised options and improve
the sample by more than 40%. In order to construct the CEO’s choice set, we take
options reported in EOEA as the CEO’s initial option portfolio at the beginning
of next fiscal year, and then adjust the choice set according to option exercises.
We require all the options in the choice set to be in the money. In the end, we
construct a high quality database with CEOs option exercises and accordingly
their option portfolios. There are 995 CEOs from 904 firms in the sample, and
there are 5,919 detailed individual option exercises.
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
We report in Table 4.1 the descriptive statistics for the option exercises.5 Con-
sistent with Klein and Maug (2011), we also document that the CEOs usually
sacrifice some of the option time value when they exercise the options. In our
sample, the CEOs on average sacrifice $2 time value, which is roughly 7% of the
option’s intrinsic value ($28.6) on average. The exercise date is about two years
before the option expiration date, and the CEO has 9 available options in her
choice set on average when she makes the option exercise decision. Klein and
Maug (2011) documents that top executives choose the option with lowest time
value in 61% of all cases, and if they make errors, these errors are generally small.
In our case, we document that in 50% of all cases CEOs choose the option with
the lowest time value (MinTVDummy=1), while in 60% of all cases, they choose
option with shortest time to maturity to exercise (MinToMDummy=1); 88% of
the all the option exercise decisions are either the option having the lowest time
value or the shortest time to maturity.
5The reason that in our sample there are few option exercises in calender year 2007, is that we
filter out these option exercises which are strongly associated with the proximity to vesting date
by removing the exercises that appear in the database for the first time.
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TABLE 4.1: Summary Statistics of Option Exercise. This table reports the distribution
and the summary statistics of CEO option exercises. There are 5,919 option exercises
for 995 CEOs from 904 firms. We use the Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) approach
to approximate the American option value. Option Time Value is defined as the option
value less the option intrinsic value. Option Intrinsic Value is calculated as Max(0, S −K),
where S and K refers the current price of the underlying and the strike price of the option,
respectively. Time to Maturity is the remaining time to the option’s expiration date, which
is the last date on which the holder can exercise the option according to its terms. Portfolio
Size refers the available options in the CEO’s choice set. Trading Volume is the number
of the exercised option. Trading Volume is the amount of the exercised option. Lowest
Time Value Dummy(MinTVDummy) and Shortest Time to Maturity Dummy (MinTomDummy)
equals 1 if the exercised option has the lowest time value and the shortest time to maturity,
respectively. The DeviationTV is the time value of the exercised option less the lowest
time value in her choice set. Unexpected Exercises Dummy (DeviationDummy) equals 1 if the
CEO deviates from expected option exercises. The DeviationExDate is the deviation in the
expiration date, that is, the difference between the chosen option’s expiration date and the
option with the shortest time to maturity in the option portfolio.
Variable and Description Calendar Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Option Time Value 2007 4 5.4 6.7 0.0 26.2
2008 1422 4.5 5.9 0.0 45.0
2009 1361 0.9 1.4 0.0 11.7
2010 1682 1.1 1.9 0.0 16.0
2011 1451 1.6 3.0 0.0 33.1
All 5919 2.0 3.8 0.0 45.0
Option Intrinsic Value 2007 4 50.7 90.0 0.0 669.5
2008 1422 32.0 47.3 0.0 624.0
2009 1361 22.7 25.4 0.0 449.6
2010 1682 25.6 40.3 0.0 455.6
2011 1451 35.4 75.7 0.0 582.6
All 5919 28.6 49.0 0 669.5
Time to Maturity (ToM, Year) 2007 4 4.1 2.5 0.1 8.9
2008 1422 2.3 2.1 0.0 8.9
2009 1361 1.8 1.9 0.0 9.0
2010 1682 1.9 1.8 0.0 8.5
2011 1451 1.8 2.0 0.0 8.9
2012 9 2.1 2.6 0.1 6.7
All 5919 2.0 2.0 0.0 9.0
Portfolio Size 2007 4 10.8 8.1 2.0 56.0
2008 1422 8.2 5.5 2.0 81.0
2009 1361 8.3 4.1 2.0 36.0
2010 1682 8.5 4.5 2.0 46.0
2011 1451 9.8 10.9 2.0 92.0
2012 9 5.0 2.7 3.0 8.0
All 5919 8.6 6.4 2.0 92.0
To Be Continued
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Continued
Variable and Description Calendar Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trading Volume (Thousands) 2007 4 26.0 55.5 0.3 320.0
2008 1422 63.3 152.6 0.1 2089.1
2009 1304 81.9 330.8 0.1 10000.0
2010 1682 81.3 185.9 0.0 2500.0
2011 1451 83.5 180.4 0.0 3380.0
2012 9 145.7 100.3 35.0 270.0
All 5919 76.9 222.5 0.0 10000.0
Lowest Time Value Dummy 2007 4 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0
(MinTVDummy) 2008 1422 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
2009 1361 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
2010 1682 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
2011 1451 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
2012 9 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
All 5304 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Shortest Time to Maturity Dummy 2007 4 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0
(MinTomDummy) 2008 1422 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
2009 1361 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
2010 1682 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
2011 1451 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
2012 9 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0
All 5919 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
Deviation in Option’s Time Value 2007 4 3.5 5.8 0 26.0
(DeviationTV) 2008 1422 1.5 3.4 0 29.8
2009 1361 0.4 1.0 0 11.0
2010 1682 0.6 1.3 0 11.3
2011 994 0.9 2.2 0 33.0
All 5919 0.9 2.3 0.0 33.0
Unexpected Exercises Dummy 2007 4 0.25 0.50 0 1
(DeviationDummy) 2008 1422 0.12 0.32 0 1
2009 1361 0.11 0.32 0 1
2010 1682 0.10 0.30 0 1
2011 1451 0.14 0.35 0 1
2012 9 0.00 0.00 0 0
All 5919 0.12 0.32 0.0 1
Deviation in Expiration Date (Year) 2007 31 2.1 1.7 0.1 6.9
(DeviationExDate) 2008 386 2.0 1.4 0.0 6.9
2009 339 1.5 1.2 0.0 8.0
2010 463 1.7 1.2 0.0 8.0
2011 206 2.0 1.8 0.1 8.2
All 1425 1.8 1.4 0.0 8.2
4.3 Empirical Setting and Results
4.3.1 Hypothesis
There is little research on the CEO’s optimal choice when she decides to exercise
an option from her option portfolio. The difficulty is that an option exercise can
be justified by many idiosyncrasies other than the private information on the
firm. Empirically these factors are hard to identify and sometimes cannot be
disentangled from private information. In this paper, our identification comes
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from the fact that the CEOs’ choices are strongly associated with the option with
lowest time value and shortest time to maturity in the CEOs’ choice sets, which
together can explain 88% of all option exercises. Our analysis builds on the
simple idea that expected option exercises are commonplace in the market, and
signal no information on the firm to the market. The essence of our approach
is to identify those unusual option exercises which are more likely to contain
insider information. We use DeviationDummy, a dummy that equals 1 if the exer-
cised option deviates from the one with the lowest time value or the one with
the shortest time to maturity, to proxy the CEO’s deviation from the expected
exercises. We document that the deviation from lowest time value (DeviationTV)
is $0.9 on average. It is relatively small to the option’s intrinsic value ($28.6),
however, it is substantial compared to the average sacrificed time value of the
exercised option ($2). We conjecture that an unexpected option exercise is more
likely to carry negative information on the firm’s future performance, e.g., sup-
pose a CEO learns privately that there will be negative shock, which will make a
marginally in-the-money option in his portfolio out of money permanently, she
may first choose to exercise this option which is over-valued by the market. This
conjecture leads to the hypothesis: unexpected option exercises carry private
information on firm’s future performance.
4.3.2 Event Study
A large literature uses the market reaction to insider trading as a measure of how
much information insider have relative to the market (e.g., Aboody and Lev 2000;
Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Ravina and Sapienza 2010; Fidrmuc, Goergen and
Renneboog 2006; Adams, Wu and Zhu 2012). We have 5,991 option exercises in
our sample, and 12% of the option exercises deviate from the expected exercises.
We employ the event study to investigate whether these “unexpected” option
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exercises are associated with firm’s future performance. We note that it is quite
common for CEOs to exercise options in consecutive days. Therefore, the over-
lapping event window problem, which may over-estimate the market’s reaction
in the event study, is a concern in the every study. To relieve this concern, we
only include the earliest one if there are more than one option exercises in the
trading month. The earliest one in a row of transactions is more informative
as they are less anticipated by the market. In this way, we have 3,135 option
exercises from 879 companies in the event study, 385 (2750) of the 3135 option
transactions are unexpected (expected) option exercise, and there are 231 and
836 companies in the transactions, respectively.
We compute the abnormal returns by using the Fama-French three factor
model. We use a 21-days event window that comprises 10 pre-event days, the
event day and 10 post-event days. We follow Ravina and Sapienza (2006) and
estimate the parameters by using 360 trading days preceding the event window.
We also follow MacKinlay (1997) and consider the market model using the CRSP
equal-weighted index as normal return. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
are calculated by summing the daily abnormal returns. We calculate CARs by
using the Fama-French three factor model and market model. We plot them
from event day -10 to event day 10 in Figure 4.1 (a) and (b), respectively. We
find that both CARs follow similar upward trend before the announcement date,
however, they diverge immediately after the reporting date, i.e., the CARs of the
unexpected option exercises experience more negative trend than the expected
option exercises. We note that in Figure 4.1 that the stock market responds to
the unexpected option exercises at day -1, one day earlier than the expected
option exercises. Our results are robust to different estimation period, e.g., over
the 120, 180 day prior to the event window. We also calculate buy-and-hold
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FIGURE 4.1: Plot of Market Reaction to Option Exercise. Plot of cumulative abnor-
mal returns (CARs) for announcement of option exercises from event day -10 to event day
10 for expected and unexpected option exercises. The abnormal returns are calculated by
using the Fama-French three factor model and market model in (a) and (b), respectively.
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abnormal returns (BHARs).6 In Table 4.2, we note that before event day -1,
both groups experience positive and significant CARs, and a Wilcoxon two-
sample test indicates that the difference in CARs is not statistically significant.
After the event day, the market’s reactions to the unexpected and expected
option exercises are significantly different. The CARs of the unexpected option
exercises are significant negative, while the CARs (BHARs) of the expected
option exercises are still positive. A Wilcoxon two-sample test indicates the
differences between the CARs, e.g., CAR (-1, 2), CAR (-1, 3), etc., are statistically
significant at the 1% level. We find similar results by using BHARs in Panel C.
4.3.3 Regression Analysis
4.3.3.1 Empirical Methodology
In the previous section, we provide evidence that unexpected option exercises are
associated with more negative market reaction in the event study. However, it is
possible that there are omitted variables, e.g., unobserved CEOs characteristics,
that drive both the option exercise pattern and market reaction. For this reason,
we repeat the analysis using essentially a differences-in-differences methodology
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Roberts and Whited 2012). In the CEO-level
data, the basic regression is:
yjt = αj + αt + γXjt + φExerciseDummyjt + δDeviationDummyjt + jt (4.1)
where j indexes CEOs, t indexes time. yjt is the dependent variable which
measures the option holder’s informativeness. αj and αt are CEO and time
6BHARj,T1,T2 =
[∏T2
t=T1
(1 +Rjt)− 1)
]
− [(1 + αˆj)T2−T1+1 − 1)]− βˆj [∏T2t=T1(1 +Rmt)− 1].
CRSP Equally weighted market index is considered as normal returns Rmt. αˆj and βˆj are
estimated in the same way as the market model.
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TABLE 4.2: Stock Market Reaction to CEO Option Exercises. This table reports the univariate test
result for the cumulative abnormal returns (Fama French three factor model and market model) and
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) around the announcement date of the option exercise in
Panel A, B and C, respectively. We use a 21-days event window that comprises 10 pre-event days, the
event day, 10 post-event days. The market model using the CRSP value-weighted index are considered
for normal return. DeviationDummy=0 refers the expected option exercises. DeviationDummy=1 refers
that the exercised option deviate from the expected option exercises. T test and Wilcoxon two-sample
test are used to test the mean and median of CARs.
Event Window Expected Option Exercises Unexpected Option Exercises Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test
(DeviationDummy=0) (DeviationDummy=1)
N Mean Median N Mean Median P-Value (P> |Z|)
Panel A: Fama-French three factor model
(-5, -1) 2742 1.07% *** 0.76% *** 385 1.06% *** 0.35% *** 0.72
(-4, -1) 2742 0.96% *** 0.66% *** 385 0.90% *** 0.34% *** 0.43
(-3, -1) 2742 0.77% *** 0.41% *** 385 0.73% *** 0.18% ** 0.55
(-2, -1) 2742 0.53% *** 0.28% *** 385 0.61% *** 0.34% *** 0.76
(-1, 0) 2742 0.30% *** 0.11% *** 385 0.00% -0.13% 0.06*
(-1, 1) 2742 0.28% *** 0.17% *** 385 -0.24% -0.31% 0.00***
(-1, 2) 2742 0.22% ** 0.10% ** 385 -0.43% * -0.66% *** 0.00***
(-1, 3) 2742 0.10% 0.01% 385 -0.48% ** -0.66% ** 0.00***
(-1, 4) 2742 0.04% 0.03% 385 -0.48% * -0.56% ** 0.01**
(-1, 5) 2742 0.03% 0.04% 385 -0.43% -0.47% ** 0.02**
Panel B: Market Model
(-5, -1) 2742 1.08% *** 0.66% *** 385 1.08% *** 0.47% *** 0.87
(-4, -1) 2742 0.98% *** 0.61% *** 385 0.92% *** 0.45% *** 0.59
(-3, -1) 2742 0.81% *** 0.43% *** 385 0.70% *** 0.21% *** 0.63
(-2, -1) 2742 0.57% *** 0.29% *** 385 0.58% *** 0.20% *** 0.97
(-1, 0) 2742 0.36% *** 0.13% *** 385 0.05% -0.05% 0.07*
(-1, 1) 2742 0.35% *** 0.18% *** 385 -0.18% -0.29% 0.01**
(-1, 2) 2742 0.28% *** 0.17% *** 385 -0.40% -0.62% *** 0.00***
(-1, 3) 2742 0.14% 0.04% 385 -0.49% ** -0.57% *** 0.00***
(-1, 4) 2742 0.05% -0.06% 385 -0.55% ** -0.64% *** 0.00***
(-1, 5) 2742 0.01% -0.03% 385 -0.58% ** -0.80% *** 0.00***
Panel C: Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns
(-5, -1) 2742 1.11% *** 0.71% *** 385 1.03% *** 0.50% *** 0.67
(-4, -1) 2742 1.01% *** 0.69% *** 385 0.86% *** 0.27% *** 0.39
(-3, -1) 2742 0.81% *** 0.47% *** 385 0.68% *** 0.28% ** 0.47
(-2, -1) 2742 0.56% *** 0.31% *** 385 0.58% *** 0.34% *** 0.99
(-1, 0) 2742 0.35% *** 0.15% *** 385 0.03% -0.12% 0.04**
(-1, 1) 2742 0.32% *** 0.15% *** 385 -0.24% -0.24% 0.01**
(-1, 2) 2742 0.24% *** 0.12% ** 385 -0.47% ** -0.67% *** 0.00***
(-1, 3) 2742 0.10% -0.04% 385 -0.57% ** -0.78% *** 0.00***
(-1, 4) 2742 0.01% -0.02% 385 -0.59% ** -0.63% *** 0.00***
(-1, 5) 2742 -0.01% -0.09% 385 -0.56% * -0.57% *** 0.00***
*, **, ***indicates significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
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fixed effects. Xjt are control variables. ExerciseDummyjt is a dummy vari-
able that equals one if there is an option exercise at time t for CEO j, and
DeviationDummyjt is a dummy variable and equals one if the option exercise is
an unexpected one. The time dummies αt control for common market circum-
stances. This methodology fully controls for fixed differences between ‘treated’
and ‘non-treated’ CEOs via CEO fixed effects.7 Variables φ and δ are of our main
interests.
4.3.3.2 Short-term Stock Market Reaction Analysis
In this section, we perform a regression analysis using abnormal returns around
the option exercises in the event study as a measure of the option holder’s
informativeness. We focus on these days when there is option exercise. In the
CEO-level data, we estimate
CAR(t1, t2)jk = αj + αk + γXjk + δDeviationDummyjk + jgk (4.2)
where k indexes the exercise time and k ∈ t, CAR(t1, t2) denotes cumulative
abnormal returns over period (t1, t2) in the event study, other notations are same
as in Equation 4.1. We use year dummies to control for time fixed effects. We
drop those CEOs with only one option exercise in the sample as there are no
variations in the option exercise pattern within CEOs.8 There are 2,859 option
exercises left for 653 CEOs in our sample. We use CAR(-1,1) as the dependent
variable in the regression. We include trading volume to control the quantitative
difference in the option exercises. DeviationDummyjk is a dummy variable and
equals one if the option exercise is an unexpected one. We also use DeviationTV,
7We follow the terminology in the literature, and call CEOs with unexpected and expected
option exercise as ‘treated’ and ‘control’, respectively.
8However, our main results are robust by including them and perform a pooled regression.
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TABLE 4.3: Option Exercise and Stock Market Reaction This table reports the result of the regression
using CAR(-1, 1) as the dependent variable. Abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama-French
three factor model. The DeviationDummy is a dummy and equals 1 if the exercised option deviates
from the expected option exercise, otherwise zero. The DeviationTV is the time value of the exercised
option less the lowest time value in her choice set. DeviationTV is re-scaled to $100. Trading Volume is
the amount of the exercised option. Robust standard errors are used. Robust t-statistics are included
in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered by the CEO.
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable CAR(-1, 1) CAR(-1, 1) CAR(-1, 1) CAR(-1, 1) CAR(-1, 1) CAR(-1, 1)
Intercept -0.018 -0.036 -0.066 -0.018 -0.035 -0.067
(0.84) (1.53) (2.73)*** (0.81) (1.55) (2.85)***
DeviationDummy (345) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(2.15)** (1.69)* (1.69)*
DeviationTV -0.017 -0.024 -0.023
(2.65)*** (2.81)*** (2.73)***
Trading Volume (Ln) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(1.07) (0.35) (0.42) (0.97) (0.29) (0.35)
Industry Fixed Effect? YES NO NO YES NO NO
CEO Fixed Effect? NO YES YES NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effect? YES NO YES YES NO YES
Observations 2859 2859 2859 2855 2855 2855
R-squared 0.03 0.26 0.26 0.03 0.26 0.26
which quantitatively captures the variations within unexpected exercises in the
regression.
We report regression results in Table 4.3. We present regression results with
DeviationDummyjk and DeviationTVjk as the explanatory variables in specifi-
cation (1)-(3) and (4)-(6), respectively. Abnormal returns are calculated using the
Fama-French three factor model.9 We document in specification (1)-(3) that there
is a significant difference in market reaction to the expected and unexpected
option exercise both within and between CEOs, and the market reacts more
negatively to unexpected option exercise than the expected one. In specification
9The regression results are robust using alternative models, e.g., market model and etc., with
firm size and book to market as control variables in the regressions.
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(1), the difference is statistically significant between CEOs, e.g., difference in
CAR(-1,1) is 50 basis points after controlling other factors. In specification (2)
and (3), the coefficient of DeviationDummyjk does not change in magnitude, but
less statistically significant by controlling all time invariant variables. We repeat
the analysis using DeviationTVjk as the explanatory variable in specification
(4)-(6). We document a significant and negative coefficient in all specifications,
and this indicates that the market reaction is more negative when the deviation
from the expected exercise is larger. The stock market reaction to unexpected
exercise differs both between and within CEOs.
4.3.3.3 Long-term Firm Performance Analysis
In this section, we investigate whether option exercise patterns are associated
with the firm’s future stock returns, i.e., whether the immediate stock market
reaction is realized into the firm’s long term performance. We aggregate option
exercise by month and estimate Equation 4.1 using monthly aggregated data.
ExerciseDummyjt equals one there are at least one option exercise for CEO j at
month t, otherwise zero. If there is at least one unexpected option exercise at the
month, then DeviationDummyjt equals one, otherwise zero. Month dummies
are used to control time fixed effects. There are 19,238 observations for 766 CEOs
in the sample over the sample period. We follow Ravina and Sapienza (2010)
and consider market adjusted stock returns of holding the firm’s stock for 30,
60, 90, 180, 360 days, respectively, as the dependent variables. In addition, we
include controls for well-known determinants of stock returns, e.g., firm size and
book to market in Panel B. There are 3,235 CEO-months when there are option
exercises for CEOs, and 536 of them are unexpected option exercise. There are
no option exercise in the remaining CEO-months.
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TABLE 4.4: Option Exercise and Firm Long-run Performance This table reports regres-
sion of future firm performance and option exercises. Option exercises are aggregated by
month. Monthly stock returns are from the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Monthly Stock
database. There are 19,238 CEO-Months. The dependent variables are market adjusted
stock return in 30, 60, 90, 180, 360 days. DeviationDummy equals 1 if the exercised option
deviates from the expected option exercises, otherwise zero. Trading Volume is the amount
of the exercised option. Firm size is measured by Total Assets at the fiscal year end in
Compustat Execucomp. Book to Market is calculated as the book value of equity over the
sum of the market value of common equity and total assets minus the book value of equity.
Robust standard errors are used. Robust t-statistics are included in parentheses. Robust
standard errors are clustered by the CEO.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Market-Adjusted Stock Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Variable RET(t+30) RET (t+60) RET (t+90) RET (t+180) RET (t+360)
Intercept 0.044 0.019 0.066 0.062 -0.145
(0.71) (0.55) (1.80)* (0.94) (9.60)***
DeviationDummy (536) -0.009 -0.019 -0.038 -0.054 -0.094
(1.21) (1.80)* (2.94)*** (3.07)*** (3.00)***
ExerciseDummy (3,235) -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.109 -0.089
(0.65) (0.55) (0.03) (3.29)*** (1.82)*
TradingVolume (Ln) -0.000 -0.002 -0.006 0.012 0.004
(0.14) (0.69) (1.26) (1.69)* (0.43)
CEO Fixed Effect? YES YES YES YES YES
Month Fixed Effect? YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 19,238 19,238 19,238 19,238 19,238
R-squared 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.52
Panel B: Robustness Check (Dependent Variable: Market-Adjusted Stock Returns)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Variable RET(t+30) RET (t+60) RET (t+90) RET (t+180) RET (t+360)
Intercept 0.203 0.408 0.703 1.097 0.499
(1.77)* (2.05)** (2.29)** (1.95)* (0.58)
DeviationDummy (536) -0.008 -0.018 -0.036 -0.051 -0.088
(1.11) (1.66)* (2.77)*** (2.87)*** (2.81)***
ExerciseDummy (3,235) -0.008 -0.01 -0.002 -0.113 -0.091
(0.71) (0.65) (0.08) (3.41)*** (1.86)*
TradingVolume (Ln) -0.000 -0.002 -0.006 0.012 0.005
(0.07) (0.60) (1.16) (1.81)* (0.48)
Total Assets (Ln) -0.018 -0.042 -0.068 -0.112 -0.084
(1.90)* (2.21)** (2.29)** (2.06)** (1.00)
Book to Market 0.093 0.159 0.226 0.416 0.802
(3.16)*** (2.85)*** (2.76)*** (3.04)*** (3.25)***
CEO Fixed Effect? YES YES YES YES YES
Month Fixed Effect? YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 19,238 19,238 19,238 19,238 19,238
R-squared 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.52
*, **, ***indicates significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.
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Table 4.4 presents the results of regression. Panel A and B reports the re-
sults without and with firm size and book to market as firm-specific control,
respectively. The main variables of our interests are ExerciseDummy and Devia-
tionDummy, and φ and δ denotes the relative informativeness of expected and
unexpected option exercises on future stock returns, respectively. We control
for CEO fixed effect and month fixed effect. The coefficient of ExerciseDummy
is negative in all specifications except (3), and statistically significant at the 1%
and 10% level in specification (4) and (5), respectively. This implies that if there
are option exercises in a particular month, then the stock returns in 180 and
360 days are significantly lower than the one without any option exercises. The
coefficient of DeviationDummy is negative in all specifications, and statistically
significant at 1% level in specification (3)-(5). It is noteworthy that the magnitude
of the coefficient becomes larger as the period goes from 30 to 360 days, which
implies that the difference in the firm’s performance is not only in short-run. Our
results are robust by including total assets and book to market as firm-specific
control in Panel B. We note that the coefficient of book to market is positive and
significant. We also document that a negative relationship between the growth
of total firm assets and subsequent firm stock returns. Both are well documented
in the literature. On the other hand, this also implies that the option exercise
pattern carries information other than the firm assets growth.
Our results also have implication for investors who would like to exploit the
information carried in the option exercise patterns by taking short positions in
the firm’s stock. Since August 29, 2002 firms are required to report the option
transaction to the SEC on Form 4 within two business days after the transaction,
and the SEC publicly discloses this information one day later on the SEC EDGAR
database. Therefore, the investor can track executive option exercise and learn
the exercise pattern with high precision. However, our results based on monthly
data imply that it may be unnecessary to track the option exercise pattern day
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by day, as a profitable portfolio only require monthly accurate information on
the option exercise pattern in our case.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a new method for examining the role of insider infor-
mation in the CEO option exercises. We focus on CEOs from S&P 1500 firms,
and construct a high-quality database with detailed information on the executive
option exercises and accordingly their option portfolios. We rely on a novel ap-
proach to distinguish the “expected” option exercises, which are more likely to
be motivated by factors irrelevant to insider information, from the “unexpected”
option exercises, which more likely carry insider information. Our analysis
builds on the simple idea that expected option exercises are commonplace in the
market, and are more associated with time to maturity, time value, diversifica-
tion or liquidity constraints, etc., and therefore signal no information on the firm
to the market. We document that 12% of them are unexpected option exercises
and indeed carry insider information. We provide evidence that the unexpected
exercises carry insider information on the CEO’s future tenure, and on the firm’s
future short-term and long-term performance.
Our findings make it necessary to build a new theoretical model on optimal
option exercise policy to fill the gap between theory and empirical evidence.
There is no such a model that considers the role of private knowledge in the
optimal option exercise policy in the literature. The new model should consider
the possibilities that option holders may also exercise based on the private
information on the future path of the stock price, or on the owners’ future tenure,
etc. Empirically, our research can be extended in two directions. First, more
research is needed to investigate what is the content of the insider information.
We are curious whether the exercise decision is related to the firm’s future policy,
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e.g., R&D policy, debt policy, etc. Second, our research can be extended to other
top executives and directors to see if their option exercise decisions carry similar
information as the ones of the CEOs.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Deze dissertatie is gericht op het verdiepen van ons begrip van moderne on-
dernemingen. Ik geef vanuit twee perspectieven een gedetailleerd beeld van
belangrijke Amerikaanse overheidsbedrijven; eigendomsstructuur en intern
nepotisme. Om deze doelstelling te bereiken maak ik twee uitgebreide em-
pirische databanken met Perl programmeertaal. Daarnaast onderzoek ik tevens
prive´ informatie uit twee onverwachte CEO keuzeoefeningen. In Hoofdstuk 2
bestudeer ik de eigendomsstructuur van grote Amerikaanse overheidsbedrijven
tijdens de afgelopen decennia en geef ik een gedetailleerd beeld van de eigen-
domsstructuur van belangrijke Amerikaanse overheidsbedrijven gedurende de
periode 1994 tot 2012. Mijn bijdrage aan de bestaande literatuur over blockhold-
ers (bijv. Dlugosz e.a. 2006; Holderness 2009) is de ontwikkeling van een grote
databank met aandeelhoudereigendom met steekproeven van 1994 tot 2012
genomen bij 3.148 grote Amerikaanse overheidsbedrijven. Met betrekking to
afgelopen 20 jaar documenteer ik een scherp opwaartse trend in eigendomscon-
centratie naar institutionele investeerders, te weten: financie¨le instituten en prive´
investeerders. Er is een scherpe toename in zowel hun eigendom als hun aantal.
Gedurende de periode van 1994 tot 2012, is het geaggregeerde institutionele
eigendom toegenomen van 10,46 procent tot 26,27 procent. De concentratie van
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eigendom is de drijvende kracht voor het opheffen van overheidsbedrijven met
veel verschillende aandeelhouders. In 2012, kon slechts 2 procent van de grote
Amerikaanse overheidsbedrijven beschouwd worden als gehouden door een
grote groep aandeelhouders.
In Hoofdstuk 3, constateer ik nepotisme binnen grote Amerikaanse overhei-
dsbedrijven. Nepotisme is een speciale vorm van sociale netwerken binnen
bedrijven, waarvan de prevalentie en de economische gevolgen nog niet sys-
tematisch bestudeerd zijn. Ik constateer familiebanden bij het zoeken met meer
dan 30 trefwoorden, wat wijst op de mogelijke aanwezigheid van nepotistische
relaties in proxybestanden met behulp van de Perl programmeertaal. Ik con-
cludeer dat nepotisme vaak voorkomt bij de SP 1500 bedrijven, waarvan 53,46
procent nepotisme vertoont. Ik ontwerp een nepotisme index om de kracht van
het nepotisme te meten. Ik ontdek dat nepotisme in verband wordt gebracht
met slechtere bedrijfsprestaties. Mijn bijdrage aan de bestaande literatuur is de
ontwikkeling van een databank voor nepotisme die de familiebanden dekt bin-
nen grote Amerikaanse overheidsbedrijven van 1994 tot 2012, en een nepotisme
index om de kracht van het nepotisme kwantitatief te meten.
In Hoofdstuk 4, dat gebaseerd is op een nieuwe CEO keuzeoefeningen en
daarmee corresponderende keuzeportfolio databank, vinden we dat 88% van
de optie oefeningen van de CEOs vooraf geplande identificeerbare ‘verwachte’
oefeningen zijn. De resterende 12% wijkt af van de verwachte keuzeoefening en
geeft informatie over de toekomstige prestaties van het bedrijf. We ontdekken dat
er een belangrijk verschil is tussen marktreacties op verwachte en niet verwachte
keuzeoefeningen, zowel binnen als tussen CEO’s. Ook documenteren we dat
de onverwachte oefeningen in verband worden gebracht met meer negatieve
toekomstige bedrijfsprestaties, zowel op de lange als op de korte termijn. Onze
studie geeft een nieuw raamwerk voor het bestuderen van voorkennis die vervat
is CEO keuzeoefeningen.
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Extracting Keywords Indicating
Nepotism in SEC Filings
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses Electronic Data Gathering, Anal-
ysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system to manage the filing submission and data
retrieval. Practical Extraction and Reporting Language (Perl) provides powerful
text processing facilities without the arbitrary data-length limits of other tools,
facilitating easy manipulation of text files.1 SEC EDGAR maintains an index file
in its FTP server to store the detailed information about the company, e.g., the
CIK of the company, filing type, filing date, and the position of the filing in the
SEC EDGAR database.2 Based on the index file, I identify the positions of all
the proxy filings in the database, and then I use the Perl programming language
to download and analyze the filing content from the SEC EDGAR database. A
regular expression is a sequence of characters that forms a search pattern, mainly
for use in pattern matching with strings, or string matching. Regular expressions
are implemented in many environments including Perl.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perl
2http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/ftpusers.htm
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In my identification, I search following keywords in the proxy filings: ‘step-
son’, ‘stepdaughter’, ‘step-son-in-law’, ‘son-in-law’, ‘son’, ‘sons’, ‘stepfather’,
‘step-father’, ‘step-father-in-law’, ‘father-in-law’, ‘father’, ‘stepmother’, ‘step-
mother’, ‘step-mother-in-law’, ‘mother-in-law’, ‘mother’, ‘sister-in-law’, ‘sis-
ter’, ‘stepdaughter’, ‘step-daughter’, ‘step-daughter-in-law’, ‘daughter-in-law’,
‘daughter’, ‘daughters’, ‘cousin’, ‘cousins’, ‘brother-in-law’, ‘stepbrother’, ‘step-
brother’, ‘brother’, ‘brothers’, ‘sibling’, ‘uncle’, ‘niece’, ‘husband’, ‘ex-husband’,
‘grandfather’, ‘grandson’, ‘wife’, ‘ex-wife’, ‘nephew’. I perform a “whole words
only” search by using a regular expression form supported by Perl program.
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Identifying Option Exercises in SEC
XML Filings
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses Electronic Data Gathering, Anal-
ysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system to manage the filing submission and data
retrieval. If you are filing an ownership form (form types 3, 3/A, 4, 4/A, 5 or
5/A), or a Regulation D or Section 4(6) form (form types D or D/A), you need to
login to SEC’s Online Forms Management website, which only supports the Ex-
tensible Markup Language (XML) filings.1 Since 2002, almost all the companies
have submitted Form 4 through XML filing. Extensible Markup Language (XML)
is a language that defines a set of rules for encoding documents in a format that
is both human-readable and machine-readable. For each Form 4 filing, there are
three files prepared by the SEC EDGAR database: a HTML file for displaying
purpose, a XML file which stores the content of Form 4 in a machine-friendly
format, and a TXT file for control purposes. The txt file contains all the contents
of the XML file, but also adds the information of the issuer and reporting owner,
e.g., SEC file number, film number and etc.
1https://www.onlineforms.edgarfiling.sec.gov
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Practical Extraction and Reporting Language (Perl) provides powerful text
processing facilities without the arbitrary data-length limits of other tools, fa-
cilitating easy manipulation of text files. We use Perl programming language
to download and extract the filing content from the SEC EDGAR database au-
tomatically and construct our own option grant and option exercises database.
This task is feasible because Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a markup
language that is machine-readable and especially friendly to the Perl program-
ming language. First, we locate the Form 4 filings in the EDGAR database by
the Central Index Key (CIK), which is used on the SEC’s computer systems to
identify corporations and individual people who have filed disclosure. SEC
EDGAR maintains an index file in its FTP server to store the detailed information
about the company. Based on the index file, we identify all the Form 4 filings’
positions in the database, and then use Perl code to download and extract the
filings’ content. By using Perl code, we construct a more complete database than
the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF).
We note that the Film Number in the SEC filing, which uniquely identifies
a Form 4 filing, is the same as the Document Control Number (DCN) in IFDF
database. By comparing the Film Number with the DCN number, we can
compare our database, which is generated by the Perl code, with the IFDF
database. For the companies in the Execucomp database, there are 517,123 film
numbers in our database, while there are 496,129 DCN number in IFDF in total,
i.e., IFDF misses 4.05% of the option transactions for S& 1500 companies in the
Execucomp database. Moreover, there are also many errors in IFDF. In our case,
we use IFDF and identify 2,376 exercised options. By using the Perl-generated
database, we improve the matching result by more than 40% and add additional
936 exercised options to the sample. There are two possible sources for the errors.
First, the IFDF cleaning process fails to correct the errors but introduces new
errors; the IFDF fails to read the data correctly from the Form 4.
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